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I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom only makes entire sense as a social and constitutional
arrangement on the supposition that God exists (or very likely exists); that
God makes claims on the loyalty and conduct of human beings; and that
such claims, rightly perceived and understood, are prior to, and superior to,
the claims of any human authority. Simply put: God’s commands—God’s
will, God’s purposes—rightfully trump man’s. Freedom of religion,
understood as a human legal right, is government’s recognition of the
priority and superiority of God’s true commands over anything the state or
anyone else requires or forbids.
That is the essence of religious liberty, understood as a natural law right.
So understood, it is not a right that human authorities confer on those whom
they rule—a dispensation. That would be, subtly and ironically, inconsistent
with the very liberty the state purports to confer. It would be an assertion, at
some level, of the priority and supremacy of the state and not God: the state,
in its beneficence, grants the exercise of religion—the strivings of
individuals and groups to discern and fulfill their duties to God, in good
faith, as they understand them—a certain amount of leeway. But the nature
and extent of such freedom is, on such a view, ultimately for the state to
judge.
The state-conferred-dispensation view, which I think is the dominant
view today, is not really religious liberty, in the sense of freedom of
religious exercise from ultimate state control. It is a cipher, shadow, or
parody of religious liberty. At bottom, what justifies religious liberty—the
only thing that makes it at all sensible as a liberty distinct from other
liberties—is some shared sense that true religious obligation is more
important than civil obligation and that, consequently, civil society must
recognize this truth. Religious liberty is the legal duty of civil society to
defer to the plausibly true free exercise of genuine religious faith.
That is the only conception that can fully justify the idea of
constitutional protection of “free exercise” of religion—protection of
freedom of religious conduct in opposition to the state’s typical commands.
The same premises support a related aspect of religious freedom (embodied
in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment): Because God’s
commands, rightly perceived, trump the state’s commands, it makes no
sense to say that the state can determine what God’s commands are and
whether an individual or group has rightly perceived them. The state may
not in this respect, or any other, set itself up as the arbiter of religious truth
and enforce its determinations as law. The state is incompetent to determine
authoritatively what God does or does not command. At least, that must be
the operating premise if the right of religious freedom is not to be a chimera.
And even if that premise must give way in clear, or extreme, cases—because
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surely there are some claims individuals make about God’s commands that
are simply intolerably and irredeemably false—a strong presumption of state
incompetence needs to be the starting point for any coherent system of
religious freedom from state control or interference.1
Thus, it is
incompatible with religious liberty for the state to “establish” an official
religion or in any fashion prescribe, and then coerce, religious exercise.
Significantly, this is not because we deny the possibility that religious
truth exists. Rather, the underlying theory of why we protect religious
liberty is that such a thing as religious truth does exist. We value freedom
for religion because we rightly prioritize true religion over the state’s
commands. We simply recognize the possibility of human error, and
especially of governmental error, in matters of religion and so we do not
trust the state to tell us the proper way to know, worship, and serve God.
We value freedom for religion precisely because, if society gets these things
wrong (as experience tells us it is quite likely to do), such errors, where
backed by the power of the state, will tend to endanger religious truth. Error
likes to stamp out truth if it has power to do so. And error is probable.
Moreover, even if it were the case that society or the state did know religious
truth, we would rightly question, on theological as well as practical grounds,
the value and propriety of coercion in matters of religious conviction. True
faith does not result from coercion—or so we are inclined to believe, often
as a matter of religious faith itself.
Thus we protect the free exercise of religion for all (or as many as
possible) and prohibit the establishment of any—not because of skepticism
about the possibility of religious truth but because of the conviction that
religious truth is a possibility and because of an agreement that such truth is
more important than anything else. We are skeptical not about truth, but
about human perceptions of it and especially about state authority to discern
or prescribe it.
My thesis is that this is, in its essence, the theory underlying and
justifying the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and that they should
be read, understood, and applied in this light. The First Amendment’s
religious liberty provisions make no sense except on the supposition that
God exists—that such a thing as religious truth exists and that the commands
of true religious faith are real and superior to the commands of civil society.
The framing generation, I submit, generally shared the supposition that God
exists and generally shared this understanding of what religious liberty is

1.

See infra notes 4345 and accompanying text.
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for. They disagreed, widely and not always cheerfully, about the nature and
character of God, the manner and content of God’s revelation, and resulting
human obligations and right conduct. But that is part of why that generation
came to agree on the idea of religious freedom.2
The language of the Religion Clauses appears to reflect such an
understanding—that is, the First Amendment’s terms seem to reflect quite
well the essentially religious premises underlying any serious commitment
to the idea of religious liberty. The Free Exercise Clause is properly
understood as conferring broad substantive immunity from government laws
or regulations that would operate to prohibit sincere religious belief and
exercise. As long as a claimed religious practice is truly religious, not
pretextual, and has any plausible claim to religious truth—that is, as long as
the claimed religious right is not contrary to the clear, universal moral
command of God, resulting in serious harms outside the truly consenting,
sincerely confessing community of faith—the state’s rule must yield in the
specific instance.3 The Establishment Clause is properly understood as
barring government from compelling religious belief or exercise or
punishing failure to adhere to a state-prescribed religious orthodoxy. It
protects the free non-exercise of religion, just as the Free Exercise Clause
protects its free exercise.4 The two clauses protect the same central liberty,
from two slightly different directions: the Establishment Clause forbids
government prescription of religious exercise; the Free Exercise Clause
forbids government proscription of religious exercise.5

2. See infra notes 5051 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 4245 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 15758 and accompanying text.
5. This position (and in some respects even the verbal formulation) is one I have advanced
before in other writing. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense
of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1609–10, 1611–25 (1997) [hereinafter
Making Sense of Religious Freedom] (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?
(1996)) (comprehensively discussing, primarily, the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) [hereinafter Paulsen, Lemon
is Dead] (discussing, primarily, the meaning of the Establishment Clause and defending the
proposition that the clause prohibits government coercion to engage in religious exercise, worship,
affirmation, or direct support of a religious institution); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA
Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995) [hereinafter
Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It] (discussing the question of what “interests” of a state should
prevail over legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986) [hereinafter Paulsen, Equal Protection
Approach] (asserting view that the Establishment Clause is properly understood as equally
protecting the freedom not to exercise religion). In this essay, I build on ideas presented in these
articles and refine and modify some of them. In doing so, I have sometimes taken the liberty of
closely paraphrasing formulations I have used before. I have endeavored not to overburden the text
with too many direct quotation marks and at the same time not to depart greatly from prior
formulations of propositions except where I really do intend a refinement (or repudiation). The
result is a certain amount of borderline-self-plagiarism, for which I hereby apologize—and which
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I began by saying that religious liberty only makes entire sense on the
basis of these essentially religious premises about the existence of God and
the priority of God’s commands. It is possible to craft a narrower, more
crabbed conception of religious liberty on different, more-or-less “secular”
premises. But such conceptions, while in some respects more intuitively
appealing to the modern liberal mind, have less explanatory power both in
terms of why we would have—why the framing generation would have
insisted upon—a specific First Amendment protection for the free exercise
of religion and in terms of what that provision actually says. Secular
theories of religious liberty are weaker theories and harder to defend on
principle.6
But there are such possible theories and one of the first inquiries in
seeking a full understanding of the Religion Clauses is to sketch the range of
possible societal stances toward religious liberty and to identify and locate
the conception that the First Amendment seems best to match. Part II of this
essay identifies four general stances toward religious freedom, gridded by
different views as to whether they proceed from the premise that religious
truth exists and different views as to whether one should be tolerant or
intolerant of individual (and group) departures from society’s general answer
to this question.7 Part III stakes the claim that the First Amendment Religion
Clauses fit into the general stance of strong toleration of individual claims to
religious free exercise because of a belief in the reality and possibility of
religious truth and liberal skepticism about the capacity of the state to
identify and prescribe such truth. The model for understanding the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, then, is “Freedom For Religion”—
protection of religious freedom because of the belief that religion is
intrinsically important and that knowledge and worship of God, and
obedience to God’s commands and expectations, is in principle more
important than anything government or society might say. Part IV discusses

this general footnote hopefully mitigates to the extent necessary by attributing the original sources in
which some of these ideas were first presented.
6. For extended discussion of this point, see Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom,
supra note 5, at 1162–63.
7. See infra Part II. In the course of that discussion, I also briefly consider the position of
radical agnosticism, a variation that purports not to know (and sometimes claims it is not possible to
know) whether or not religious truth exists. I believe that this position tends to collapse either into a
position that credits the possibility of religious truth and concedes its (theoretical) priority over the
commands of the State or (more often, perhaps) into a position of such complete radical skepticism
of religious claims as to amount to disbelief and thus unwillingness to grant religious conduct
priority over society’s usual commands. Agnosticism thus tends to tip into either my second or third
categories described below. See infra note 9.
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how this model might help illumine understanding of the language of the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause, and
guide its faithful application. In particular, it helps explain why the First
Amendment, properly construed, protects only the free exercise of religion
and not analogous claims of secular conscience and conduct, no matter how
similar in form or sympathetic; why it protects such free exercise even from
facially neutral laws; and why and how religious premises may help identify
the bounds, or limits, of cognizable claims of freedom—immunity from state
authority—for religion.
II. FOUR STANCES TOWARD RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
There are fundamentally four types of stances a society, and its
governmental system, can adopt with respect to the relationship between
state authority and religious exercise. The first two proceed from a society’s
general understanding that religious truth exists, but fork off in different
directions depending on views about the role of the state in defining and
enforcing religious truth. The first view thinks the state can know what
religious truth is and should enforce it; the second thinks the state is not
competent to judge such matters and should tolerate, even embrace, private
freedom to decide and act on views that may differ from a society’s general
view of what religious truth is.
The third and fourth stances proceed from a society’s general view that
religious truth does not exist, but take different positions as to what stance
the state should take with respect to persons or groups who nonetheless
believe in religious truth. The third view tolerates beliefs and to some extent
conduct at variance with the non-religious general views of society; the
fourth view tends to regard most any religious conduct at variance with
society’s laws as unjustified and unacceptable.
The four stances usefully can be arranged in a crudely chronological
fashion from a “pre-liberal” stance of religious intolerance (because of a
belief in religious truth), to a “liberal” stance of religious tolerance (because
of a belief in religious truth), to a “modern” stance of religious tolerance
(despite a disbelief in religious truth), and finally to a “post-modern” stance
of religious intolerance (because of a disbelief in religious truth). The labels
are imperfect8 and the lines between categories often blurred. But, painting

8. In prior writing, I have sometimes used the term “liberal” to describe what I here dub
“modern.” Both labels are imperfect. My intention here is to distinguish between classical liberal
understandings of the reasons for protecting religious liberty that were dominant in the eighteenth
and at least early nineteenth centuries—views influenced by intellectual currents formed by the
Reformation, Renaissance, Great Awakening, and Enlightenment but that ultimately accept the
reality of God and the priority of God’s commands over man’s law—and later, twentieth century
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with a broad brush, the different categories correspond generally to real
differences in paradigms of the relationship between religious and state
authority.9

“modern” understandings of the reasons for religious liberty that purport to depend less (or not at all)
on whether or not God exists and makes true commands that bind human conscience and conduct.
9. See infra Part IV.A.1–4. What about a stance of societal religious agnosticism? Is there a
possible fifth category, in which society (or the State) is completely agnostic about religious truth
and derives its approach to religious freedom from such thoroughgoing agnosticism? On such a
view, a society might embrace religious freedom because it does not know whether or not there is
such a thing as religious truth, and (therefore) agrees to provide religious freedom to those who
assert that there is such a truth and seek to live in accordance with such premises: after all, such
persons may be right. (But they also might not be right.)
This stance resembles, in different ways, the second and third stances toward religious
freedom identified in the text. Like the second strategy, it doubts government’s epistemological
ability to discern religious truth. But not merely because it distrusts government: agnosticism doubts
that there is such a thing as religious truth. Like the third category, it is willing, in theory, to grant at
least some degree of religious freedom to religious adherents notwithstanding doubts that God
exists—doubts that religious conviction corresponds to anything real. A posture of agnosticism thus
straddles, to some degree, the two middle positions, embracing aspects of both. It agrees with the
idea of religious liberty, not because of belief in God and not despite belief in God but because of
uncertainty, lack of knowledge, or inherent failure of knowledge. A society’s belief, or disbelief, in
God, is, on this view, irrelevant.
The key question is whether agnosticism is an unnecessary fifth wheel to my nice two-bytwo grid, or a genuinely independent fifth point of a pentagon. My sense is that agnosticism tends to
collapse, analytically, into one or another of the existing categories and thus may fairly be treated as
a variant of one or the other such categories. Agnosticism in matters of religion (for individuals,
certainly, and presumably for a society that is so described) is never, except in pure theory, a
position of complete equipoise between belief and disbelief. It leans—in one direction or another.
For example, if a society’s agnosticism tilts slightly in the direction of accepting the
possibility that religious truth exists—and crediting that possibility so far as to concede that if
religious truth exists, that truth should prevail over any contrary commands of society—it is
essentially indistinguishable from my second category described below: we should grant broad
religious freedom to act in ways different from usual secular authority; and we should deny secular
authority power to prescribe any particular view. (The State should be, officially, “agnostic.”) If, on
the other hand, a society’s general religious agnosticism or skepticism tilts in the opposite direction
of doubting that religious truth exists, its stance toward religious freedom will more closely
resemble my third category: it will tend to tolerate religious exercise, to a degree, but doubt whether
the claims of religion should defeat the claims of society over individual and group conduct. Even
more so, such a view doubts that religious claims should ever be preferred over analogous, secular
ethical claims. In these respects, the stance of agnosticism very closely resembles the third stance I
describe—the “modern” view. It is simply a less-certain-that-God-does-not-exist subcategory within
that third category and analytically indistinguishable from it. (This is in fact the direction in which I
think most positions of agnosticism tend to lean, and fall. But that is an empirical question about
which I am . . . agnostic.)
Of course, to describe a society as “agnostic” is in some sense as artificial as it is to describe
a society’s stance as proceeding from a view that God exists or does not exist. These are analytic
categories—constructs—far more than descriptions of sociological fact. (Societies comprise a
mixture of views.) From the standpoint of thinking about why and to what degree or in what ways a
society might protect religious liberty, it is useful to think in terms of such analytic constructs. My
point here is that it is unclear that the category of religious agnosticism is a usefully distinct analytic
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A. Religious Intolerance out of Religious Conviction: The “Pre-Liberal”
Stance
The first possibility is that a society believes that religious truth exists
and that society and the (religious) state know what that truth is and
therefore should not tolerate contrary positions. The logic behind such a
position is that if one is fully convinced both that God exists and that one
knows precisely what God commands, requires, or expects (and if there is
broad agreement within society on these points), toleration of dissent is
toleration of grave, destructive, and fundamental moral error—harmful both
to the individuals concerned and society at large. To allow dissenting
conduct, or even dissenting expression, is (on this view) inconsistent with
the premise that religious truth exists and we know of what that truth
consists. Why tolerate error on these most fundamental of things? More
than that, the conduct and stance of the state and of society as a whole
should reflect the known, agreed understanding of God’s will.
The consequence of such a “pre-liberal” view is that there is no room for
freedom of religious exercise at variance with the commands of the state.
There is not, and should not be, any “free exercise” of religion in this strong
sense. Nor, even, should religious dissent be tolerated. Furthermore, it
makes entire sense to prescribe by law what religious beliefs should be
official, conform all state policy to such beliefs, and prescribe their
observance.
The pre-liberal view logically embraces, in short, an
“established” religion, prescribed by the state and enforced upon all subjects
or citizens of the state. Its hallmarks are state prescription and state coercion
in matters of religion.
One readily recognizes in this stance the views that led to religious
conflicts and wars in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere for centuries.
These views formed part of the European history against which the
quintessentially American view of religious liberty was reacting, and from
which many European-Americans were fleeing in the century preceding
American independence.10 One can also recognize in this stance the views

category for thinking about why and how a society might constitutionally protect religious freedom.
Recognizing and respecting the possibility of a contrary view, I nonetheless will treat agnosticism
not as a separate category but will fold it into the discussion of my second and third categories of
societal stances toward religious freedom.
I am indebted to comments from, and conversations with, John Nagle and Robert Delahunty
for helping me clarify my thinking on this point.
10. Of course, as soon as religious dissenters fleeing oppressive pre-liberal, state-religion
European regimes reached America, some of them replicated the pre-liberal pattern in their new
communities. This led religious dissenters in the American colonies to flee pre-liberal, state-religion
American regimes. This history, too, formed part of the American experience leading to an eventual
reaction against such arrangements. For excellent historical treatments, see JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER
WILLIAMS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL (2012); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST
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that form various radical Islamist movements even today, and some
fundamentalist strands of other religions.11 The pre-liberal view obviously is
not dead; it persists in many areas of the globe and in certain religious
communities.12 It proceeds from a sincere conviction of religious truth, and
it insists, as a result of that conviction, that falsity—all that does not conform
to the religious truth so identified—be defeated, repudiated, extirpated,
overcome, or killed.
This view believes in what I would call “The Priority of God” and
shares that belief with the liberal stance that I discuss next: God’s
requirements and expectations are more important than any contrary human
commands. The difference is that the pre-liberal view believes that society,
and the state, reliably know what God’s requirements and expectations are
and that it is proper for the state to impose those commands as its human
commands, enforce conformity to them, and obliterate (to the extent
possible) dissent.
B. Religious Tolerance out of Religious Conviction: The “Liberal” Stance
The second possibility—and the one I ultimately conclude is the
American constitutional stance—is that a society believes that religious truth
exists but that society and the state do not reliably know what constitutes
true religion, and thus cannot be trusted to get these things right. The state is
“liberal” (in an Enlightenment, seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of
the term) in that it embraces individual liberty on such matters. The state is
neutral, or at least tolerant, but not necessarily agnostic in matters of
religion.13
The state embraces religious liberty, on this view, not because society
disbelieves in the possibility of religious truth, but precisely because it
believes in the possibility of religious truth. Society merely disbelieves in
state authority over religion and does not share the (naïve) intuition that
whatever a majority might believe in matters of religion is therefore the

FREEDOM: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986);
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965).
11. For excellent treatments of radical Islamism, see MARY HABECK, KNOWING THE ENEMY:
JIHADIST IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING
TOWER: AL QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 (2006); see also WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, JUSTICE AND
THE ENEMY: NUREMBERG, 9/11, AND THE TRIAL OF KHALID SHEIK MOHAMMED, 40–52 (2011).
12. See sources cited supra note 11.
13. The State, or society, might in fact be agnostic about religion, in the sense of not knowing
whether religious truth exists, but still accepting the possibility of such truth. See supra note 9.
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correct understanding of religion. The people share a pervasive conviction
of religious truth and in the priority of God’s commands over man’s but,
often as a result of this same conviction, they also share a pervasive distrust
of state authority to prescribe religious truth. After all, if the idea is that
God’s commands are prior to and superior to any obligations imposed by the
state—in the words of the disciple Peter, recorded in the book of Acts, “We
must obey God, not men”14—on what reasoning can it be accepted that the
state (peopled by “men” and not necessarily good ones) necessarily has the
right ideas about what God commands? The very idea of state authority to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of religious belief and conduct is
inconsistent with the premise of the priority of God and God’s commands
over those of any mere human authority.
Unless, that is, one assumes that the state always perfectly reflects the
priorities of God in its decisions, actions, and requirements. Liberal
societies, in their stance toward religious freedom, of course reject any such
assumption. In part, that rejection is based on those societies’ lived
experiences and histories—they have seen governments that thought they
knew religious truth, had it wrong (in the view of many), and oppressed
dissenters who probably had it (more) right. America was settled in part by
people fleeing such governments. In part, the rejection of state competence
is based on liberal societies’ theologies—their religious premises. There is
much in Christianity, for example (and in many strands of Judaism), the
overwhelmingly dominant religious stance of early America, that leads to
skepticism about the necessary correctness of everything and anything the
state decides and prescribes. The state may be right in its action and it may
be wrong. And that observation surely extends to the state’s religious
views.15
More than that, the liberal view holds that worship of God, and
obedience to God’s commands, is a “natural right”—one of those
fundamental rights of man that precedes the social compact and is never
superseded by it.16 Again, this flows in substantial part from religious

14.
15.

Acts 5:29 (Today’s English Version).
See generally Acts 5:27–29 (Today’s English Version); JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION 675–76 (Henry Beveridge trans., Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ’g Co. 1989) (1536)
(“We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord.”); DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 262–63 (R.H. Fuller & Irmgard Booth trans., Simon &
Schuster 1995) (1937) (“[T]he sovereign power belongs to God and not to the State”). Compare
Romans 13:1 (Today’s English Version) (“Everyone must obey the state authorities, because no
authority exists without God’s permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by
God.”). However Romans 13 is properly understood concerning the relationship between Christians
and the secular authority of governments, the passage certainly cannot be read as standing for the
view that secular government has authority to determine religious truth.
16. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (“All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God.”).
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conviction about the priority of God and of God’s commands. People might
surrender some of their state-of-nature liberty in order to form a collective,
civilized society that protects other types of rights against interference from
private violence by the predatory strong at the expense of the innocent weak.
But the right to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own
conscience is not a right that is ever justifiably surrendered to society and the
state. That is because God exists and has a prior and always superior claim
on human loyalty. The state acts legitimately only when it honors those
prior claims of God.
Thus, the liberal stance is that, while religious truth exists, that does not
mean the state can decide what it is. Individuals, and private groups, get to
decide what it is, and have the right—the natural right—to act in accordance
with their sincere conviction as to what that truth is. Freedom of religion,
within such a society, is the collective embrace of the correctness of this
proposition.
It is the state’s acknowledgement, in its fundamental
constitution of government, that it is not the supreme authority in this
respect; God is. This means that the state must yield to private religious
conscience, at least in the absence of some reasonably certain demonstration
that the claim of religious conviction is insincere, not really religious, or
harmfully outside the bounds of anything that plausibly could be thought the
true command of God—not really the true “exercise of religion” in any
plausibly recognizable, legitimate sense. (I will have more to say about this
below: the collective conviction that there is such a thing as religious truth
establishes boundaries, in extreme cases, on the claims that may be made in
the name of God or religious conviction. In the end, I believe this is the only
fully convincing rationale for what Free Exercise Clause doctrine has
sometimes recognized as “compelling state interest” overrides of
presumptive claims for religious autonomy.17)
Under the liberal view, because the state is not supreme, the state must
yield to the legitimate free exercise of religion. And because the state is not
supreme, it may not prescribe and compel adherence to, or coerce, religious
observance—it must respect the non-exercise of any particular religion, as a
corollary aspect of true religious freedom. The consequence is “disestablishment” of religion and broad freedom for religious exercise and nonexercise—religious freedom because society believes in God, believes in
religious truth, and believes that such truth can only survive, thrive, and
prevail in an atmosphere of religious liberty.

17.

See infra pp. 1210–11.
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Such religious liberty can come in weak and in strong variations. The
Lockean and early American concept of religious “toleration” is a weaker
version of religious freedom than is the later, constitutional concept of “free
exercise.”18 Within either variation, there are difficult instances of
application on the margins—questions that I explore briefly below. But the
fundamental liberal paradigm of constitutional religious liberty is that the
state recognizes and protects religious liberty as a natural right, out of an
essentially religious acknowledgement that God’s authority categorically
prevails over the state’s.
C. Religious Tolerance out of the Conviction that Religious Truth Does Not
Exist: The “Modern” View of Rational Skepticism
A third possible stance is religious tolerance even where society does
not believe in the possibility or reality of religious truth or is deeply
skeptical about such claims. Religious truth does not exist, in this view, but
religion nonetheless should be tolerated, and its free exercise indulged or
permitted, at least within reasonable bounds. I call this the “modern” view,
a label that seeks to capture, however imprecisely, its somewhat “postliberal” character, its relative recentness, and its broader twentieth century
perspective of rationalism and skepticism. It is distinguishable from the
liberal view in its attitude toward religion: it is a post-religious, agnostic,
secularist view of reality. It succeeds to the liberal view’s skepticism about
government’s capacity to identify truth in matters of religion, and to its
skepticism about the legitimacy of government power over matters of
individual liberty and choice generally. But unlike the liberal view of
religious freedom, the modern view is skeptical about religious truth claims
generally, not just government power.
On this view, we protect religious liberty not because religion is
fundamentally important—not because we believe God exists and makes
claims on humans that are of prior and superior obligation to those of the
state; God either does not exist or does not really make such claims. Rather,
we protect religious liberty because many people continue to hold such
beliefs and it is consistent with the modern idea of individual autonomy to
allow different people to believe different things, and to the extent
practicable and sensible, to allow people to live and act autonomously on the
basis of their different belief systems. Under this view, all sets of beliefs,
religious or not, are equally tolerable. None is to be preferred by the state
over any other. Freedom and individual autonomy are, in general, valuable
ideals and should be furthered by state policy. This holds true with respect

18. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689),
available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerate.htm.
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to religion the same as anything else—and not any more so. At root, there is
nothing special about religious beliefs. The modern view scrunches up its
forehead at the oddness of a phrase like “The Priority of God.”
If the liberal view is, as I think, the original American constitutional
view embodied in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, the modern
view is the late-twentieth century and early twenty-first century dominant
American cultural understanding of religious freedom, and the one that
increasingly has come to be embodied in Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Religion Clauses.19 “Religious freedom” is not about the
priority of God’s claims over Man’s. Religious freedom is, rather, society’s
and the state’s gently condescending indulgence of the fact that certain
benighted people continue to take the notion of religion seriously and that it
is not very nice, or very important, for the state to suppress such views. To
be sure, the First Amendment contains distinct religious freedom provisions
that appear to have treated religious freedom in particular as its own kind of
special right, but the modern attitude is almost one of viewing the First
Amendment’s protection of religion as akin to “historic preservation” of
something quaint. The only way to make sense of such a constitutional
provision today is to broaden it to reflect the equality of all belief systems.
Belief in God is a particular form of belief and people should generally have
freedom to believe what they want to believe.
This view accepts the idea of religious freedom, but without the
religious premises that (at least initially) gave it life and depth. It leads,
naturally, to a weaker, less robust conception of religious freedom, for the
simple reason that the underlying justification for such freedom is weaker.
Religious freedom, on this view, makes sense for the same reasons that
society protects individual freedom and autonomy generally: it is nice, good,
liberal, and tolerant. The obvious weakness here, on which I elaborate
below, is that such a justification does little to support religious freedom
specifically.20
Religious freedom, on this view, also makes sense, to a certain extent, as
a neo-Hobbesian “truce,” imposed by the state, to avoid the strife occasioned

19. Mapping this intuition onto the pattern of Supreme Court Religion Clause decisions of the
past sixty years or so would be a fascinating (if exhausting) project, which I do not wish to undertake
here. I leave it as an intuition, formed from a general sense of the “look” of fifty to seventy years,
standing back a good distance from the painting created by the patterns of individual decisions. I
invite the reader to adopt a similar perspective and see if the intuition matches with his or her own.
20. I develop this view at length in Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5,
at 1600–04, building on important insights first suggested to me by a chapter in John Garvey’s
excellent book, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?, cited supra at note 5.
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by religious sects competing for social and political dominance over one
another, each motivated by its own competing vision of religious truth.21
The weakness here is that such a justification is a most incomplete
explanation for religious liberty: it at most justifies a prohibition on
government establishment and coercion of official religious views and
conduct. (Perhaps there will be no religious wars if the rules are that no sect
can win the game and dominate or exterminate the others even if they win;
all must be allowed to exist in freedom.) But it does not do much to justify a
generous conception of the free exercise of religion: one could enforce
religious peace by establishing none and suppressing all, too, as long as one
had the resources, will, and inclination to suppress religion (rather than to
protect its irritating free exercise).22
The practical doctrinal consequences of the “modern” posture, for First
Amendment law, are as follows. First, there certainly should be no
establishment of religion or anything at all like an establishment; indeed, to
treat religious beliefs and exercise differently from secular beliefs and
conduct begins to take on the feel of an unjustifiable establishment of
religion. Why, after all, would it be at all sensible for religion to be treated
preferably to anything else? Religious faith does not, from a secularist
standpoint, really correspond to anything objectively real and of superior
obligation. (God does not exist, at least not in the sense of traditional
religions’ conceptions of God.) There is thus nothing special about religious
beliefs in particular, as opposed to any other set of strongly held personal
beliefs. It is merely one belief set that people may hold. There’s nothing
wrong with that, on the modern view, but there’s nothing wrong with any
other such belief sets and—this is the crucial shift—it is improper to treat
competing belief–sets and worldview paradigms differently. That is part of
what “no establishment of religion” means—at least when viewed through
modernist eyes. Non-establishment, on the modern view, tends strongly in
the direction of a more thoroughgoing secular relativism.
A second, related consequence of the modern view is that the Free
Exercise Clause becomes hard to accept as requiring special accommodation
of religion in particular in the form of exemption, or immunity, from the
usual rules of civil society. Freedom of belief is fine—if embraced across

21. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 257–67 (Forgotten Books 2008) (1651) (noting that a
Christian monarch ought to determine what constitutes the law of God, and that such matters should
not be left to the separate determination of different Christian sects or of the Pope).
22. I develop this argument in earlier writing as well. Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious
Freedom, supra note 5, at 1604–09. Indeed, one might even establish religious peace by
establishing official religious views and policy, and enforcing the establishment orthodoxy with
ruthless efficiency and state coercive power. That actually was Thomas Hobbes’s view. See
HOBBES, supra note 21, at 381 (concluding that Christian sovereigns have absolute power over their
subjects’ religion and may “make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest”).
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the board with respect to all beliefs, religious or not. That value can be
assimilated comfortably to the values protected in a similar fashion by
broad, contemporary notions of the freedom of speech. As a rule, all speech
must be treated alike, regardless of its content or viewpoint: “There is an
equality of status in the field of ideas.”23
But it is hard to justify the free exercise of religious beliefs that in any
way seriously conflict with the usual norms of society, under the modern
stance. Why tolerate religion,24 in this strong sense of exempting religious
practice from certain of the rules that govern everyone else? On the
premises of the modern view, God does not really exist; “God” does not
really make commands of loyalty and obedience that constrain human
behavior. Religious belief is just a choice that people make, a preference
like any other. To borrow Stephen Carter’s memorable phrase, the modern
view tends to regard “God as a hobby” some people happen to have
chosen.25 It is fine for the state to accommodate, even indulge, its citizens’
hobbies, at least to some extent and if the free exercise of such hobbies does
not impair anything the state otherwise thinks important. (On the other
hand, if something is important enough to pass a law about, the state
probably regards the activity as important enough not to permit hobbyexceptions.) But in a situation in which the state ordinarily would not feel
inclined to accommodate individual’s choices and hobbies as exceptions to
its rules, there is no good reason to accommodate religious exercise. It thus
becomes very hard, on this view—unacceptable really, if one accepts
broadened, modern no-establishment principles—to embrace any
proposition that religious exercise must be granted a sphere of autonomy or
immunity from government regulation broader than any other set of beliefs
would have in analogous circumstances. Thus, for example, a religious
claim to conscientious objection from military service, on the modern view,
should have no greater purchase than a wholly non-religious secular

23. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). There are certain exceptions and
variations, but this is the usual rule. For a survey, see PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 950–58 (2010) (“A Map of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech.”). For a brief
defense, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1919–
22 (2001). Religious speech participates fully in the benefits of this general rule. The religious
content of speech by private parties, or the religious identity of the speaker or speakers, is not a basis
for discrimination against such speech. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). This rule, however,
is sometimes honored in the breach. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
24. See Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008–2009).
25. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 23–43 (1993).
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conscientious objection claim. The government should grant both of them
or neither of them. But it should not treat them differently.26
Moreover, where circumstances are not precisely analogous—where
comparable secular claims of autonomy either do not exist or probably
would be dismissed out of hand (for example, Native American religious
claims to use otherwise illegal, controlled substances in religious
ceremonies,27 to unique access to federal forest lands for site-specific
religious observance,28 or to exemption from endangered species law
prohibitions on Eagle Feather use29), it becomes hard for the modern view to
rationalize accommodations of religion that impose anything other than de
minimis costs on others, or that occasion any measurable degree of
administrative inconvenience or inefficiency, including the asserted
inconvenience and inefficiency of making any type of accommodation at all,
let alone of sorting out genuine religious claims from spurious ones.
The overall result is a “strong” reading of the Establishment Clause’s
prohibition as tending to forbid any accommodation of religious exercise, let
alone special accommodation for religion specifically, and a “weak” reading
of the Free Exercise Clause as essentially duplicating the protections of the
Free Speech Clause–freedom of belief, freedom of expression, and no
discrimination based on religious views or identity—but lacking any
meaningful punch of its own. Unless costless, and unless it would be
granted to non-religious persons on the same terms, religious exercise need
not and should not be given any immunity from the operation of the usual
rules adopted by society’s government.
As noted above, I think this vision is not the vision contemplated by the
framing generation or embodied in the original meaning of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. But it is an entirely understandable and
coherent vision, logical on its own terms, if one reads the Religion Clauses
through “modern” eyes.30 If one has the view (or if the overall society has

26. This is the perspective adopted, in essence, by the series of cases concerning conscientious
objection to the military draft. See Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at
1603, 1617–20. I address this specific issue as an important illustration of the modern perspective
later in this Article. See infra Part IV.A.3.
27. See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
30. The problem with adopting such a perspective is much like the problem with reading the
words and phrases of the Constitution to mean things they did not mean at the time written and
adopted: it is anachronistic. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 875–77 (2009). Just as the meaning of words in an
authoritative written legal text must be understood in the sense, and in the context, in which they
would have been understood at the time and in the place where written, the backdrop understanding
or perspective one brings to reading and applying such a text should attempt to approximate as
nearly as possible the views and perspectives that readers of the text would have had at the time it
was written and adopted as constitutional law. See infra Part III.
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such a view, or if the governing elites hold such a view) that religious faith
is simply a subjective, idiosyncratic personal preference that does not
conform to objective reality, it truly does not make much sense to accord
religious exercise special treatment or accommodation. Why would one do
such a thing? To the committed atheist, or even the rigorously (and perhaps
doctrinaire) agnostic, granting religious exercise a special freedom from the
usual rules of government is awkward, to say the least. That awkwardness
then drives the modern interpreter toward a reading of the First
Amendment’s protection of the right to “the free exercise [of religion]” that
is as ungenerous, as un-special, as possible given the language. Viewed
from an agnostic perspective—the modern stance—religious freedom is an
odd right, a constitutional “anomaly” to be hedged in on all sides,
grudgingly acknowledged, and narrowly construed.31 The alternative would
be madness—allowing every person to be, in the words of Reynolds v.
United States, the 1879 Supreme Court case upholding a federal statutory
ban on polygamy, “a law unto himself.”32 The phrase is revealing: God does
not (really) command a particular claimed religious observance or conduct;
religious adherents make up these things for themselves. The modern
stance, already incipient in the late nineteenth century, is that religious
exercise is not really obedience to the law of God; it is every man claiming
the right to be a law unto himself.
As noted, I think this follows logically from the (often unstated) premise
of the modern view that God does not really exist and make claims on
human conduct and loyalty that have priority over the claims of state and
society. If the premise is right, the conclusion is right: religious freedom
really is an odd freedom to have written into the Constitution and ought to
be construed as narrowly as possible. Indeed, I would state the proposition
in bolder terms yet: If God does not exist, religious freedom is a kooky
enterprise, protecting delusional people’s delusions and their actions
predicated on such delusions, and giving those delusions priority over the
general laws of society. Who would embrace such a thing? The modern

31. See Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1610–15. This is the
view adopted by the Supreme Court in the notable case of Employment Division v. Smith. See Smith,
494 U.S. at 886–88 (arguing that a broad Free Exercise Clause right of religious persons “to ignore
generally applicable laws” would be “a constitutional anomaly” and that, consequently, recognizing
such a right would be “courting anarchy”). It is perhaps ironic that this modern view was embraced
so vigorously by the writer of the majority opinion in Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, who is himself a
devout religious believer—a Roman Catholic Christian. See generally, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen
& Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1997).
32. 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879).
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view, sensibly on its own terms, treats the free exercise of religion as a
problematic liberty, to be assimilated as nearly as possible to other
constitutional values (like freedom of speech), not as a sweeping, inalienable
natural right.
The modern view is easy enough to understand, and actually shares
some insights in common with the “liberal” view. First, even on the liberal
view, some claims of autonomy, made in the name of God and religion, are
simply untenable—delusional, demented, insincere, pretextual, or otherwise
so outside the bounds of what plausibly may be attributed to God as not to
warrant treatment as part of the genuine exercise of “religion.” Even on the
liberal view, then, certain claims of religious freedom lose to society’s rules;
they do not warrant First Amendment protection as truly involving the free
exercise of religion. In the end, I defend this position, which generally goes
under the heading of “compelling state interests” that trump otherwise valid
religious claims, as implicit in the essentially religious justification for
religious freedom: some claims concerning God’s commands we simply can
judge not to be valid and true and thus fall outside the range of constitutional
protection. We tolerate some bogus or bananas claims of religious freedom
as a prophylactic matter, but at some squeal point we simply reject them as
implausible.
Note, however, how disturbingly similar this is (albeit at a somewhat
different level) to the modern view’s treatment of all religious beliefs, which
is that none of them corresponds to anything true or real. The difference is
that the liberal view starts from the premise that God exists and that there is
such a thing as true knowledge, belief, and obedience to God’s true
commands. There are also some nonsense claims about God and God’s
commands and some of these may assume the same superficial form as
genuine religious claims. This observation follows logically from the view
that there is such a thing as religious truth; religious truth means that there is
such a thing as untrue claims made in the name of religion. The task of a
religious freedom rule in the liberal view is to protect the former, to the
maximum extent, without sweeping in too much of the latter. The modern
view overlaps with this view to the extent of believing that it is possible to
identify some religious truth claims as nonsense. Indeed, the modern view
starts from the premise that God does not exist and there is no such thing as
true knowledge, belief, and obedience to God’s true commands. When push
comes to shove, it is all nonsense, and the task of a religious freedom rule is
to protect as little of such nonsense as possible. The modern view thus takes
one aspect of the liberal view and runs with it, but in a secular direction
because of secular cultural premises.
The second insight shared by the modern view and the liberal view is
skepticism about the human capacity accurately to discern God’s will. For
the liberal view, this skepticism translates into a thoroughgoing distrust of
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government power either to prescribe religious exercise for all, or to deny
free exercise of religion contrary to the usual rules. Folks get God wrong; a
majority can get God wrong. And there’s nothing more dangerous to the
freedom to pursue and exercise true religious knowledge, worship, and
obedience than the wrong claims of state and society that the majority, or the
elites, know better what is the truth in matters of religion.
But the liberal stance’s correct skepticism about the state’s ability to
discern religious truth—because it is a mere human enterprise and humans
err—can subtly shade into skepticism generally about anyone’s ability to
discern religious truth, including the individual’s or the church’s (or other
religious organization’s). The modern view takes skepticism and runs with
it, too. After all, if we don’t trust the state because we don’t trust human
authority to perceive correctly the commands or will of God, why should we
trust any particular human to get it right either? Skepticism yields more
skepticism. If, functionally, as a matter of governance of all, we are of the
view that human beings cannot be trusted to correctly perceive the will of
God, why should the whole of society ever defer to an individual’s or
minority religious community’s views in this regard? Why is the one
suddenly more likely to have it right than the many? Thus, a “soft” modern
view might well take the view that, even if there might be such a thing as
true beliefs about God, we cannot trust any individual to discern them
correctly. Thus, it makes no sense to exempt such persons (or groups) from
the general rules of law adopted by the community. In practical effect,
individual claims to religious freedom from government’s laws really do
make the religious adherent “a law unto himself.” Because we cannot tell
whether such adherent is correctly perceiving God’s commands or not, we
have no basis for excusing his conduct, even if we concede the theoretical
possibility of God making actual commands.
The difference between the liberal view (religious freedom out of
religious conviction) and the modern view (religious freedom
notwithstanding religious disbelief) is in this respect a function of the extent
of skepticism about the possibility of true religious claims generally and the
“good faith” (so to speak) of religious persons. For the Believer, and for a
society that consists largely of religious believers, there exists the confidence
that there is such a thing as religious Truth, that this truth is Good, and that
this Truth does not lead to a vast swath of absurd, society-destructive claims.
There is, in short, a confidence—a faith—in the ultimate ability to separate
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the wheat from the chaff (to borrow a well known religious metaphor).33
And there is an acknowledgement that, to a certain substantial extent, the
weeds must be permitted to grow along with the wheat, lest the good crop be
cut down and killed with the weeds.34
In the modern view, the wheat and the weeds are essentially
indistinguishable. There is no “good crop,” really; it’s all a matter of
individual preferences and beliefs. When individual preferences can be
accommodated in general, it’s fine to do so. But when individual
preferences need to be overridden, they need to be overridden. Wheat and
weeds being indistinguishable, they are either permitted to grow together, or
where deemed necessary by secular interests, they may both be mowed
down or ploughed under.
D. Religious Intolerance out of the Conviction that Religious Truth Does
Not Exist: The “Post-Modern” View
The final stance brings us full circle: religious intolerance, not because
the state believes in God and wishes to establish the One True Faith and
suppress all competing notions (the “pre-liberal” view), but religious
intolerance because the state disbelieves in God and thus has no use for—
and little tolerance of—religious conduct that in any way resists the
supposedly more rational, sensible norms the state has adopted as the rules
for governing the society in question. Once again, this “post-modern” view
proceeds from and succeeds to some of the views of the preceding,
“modern” perspective.35 It simply takes that perspective to a more extreme
conclusion. Just as the modern view takes the skepticism of the liberal view
seriously, and runs with it—adding modern doubt about religious truth—the
post-modern view takes the modern view’s disbelief in God seriously, and
runs with that view. Given the weakness of the conception of religious
liberty justified by the modern view, the post-modern perspective simply
takes the next logical step, and knocks out the last prop sustaining any
serious notion of religious liberty. Given that God does not exist, the
rationales for religious liberty embraced by the modern view are weak and
archaic. It is better to dispense with them altogether and go straight to the
last page of the story. God, if He ever existed, is dead. And gone with him
is any sensible claim to religious autonomy in contravention of the usual
norms of secular society.
This view holds, then, that religious truth does not exist and that it is
affirmatively harmful to secular society to permit the free exercise of such

33.
34.
35.
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views. Whether or not such beliefs and their expression must be tolerated as
an aspect of the freedom of speech, the state always has a legitimate interest
in suppressing religiously-motivated behaviors in conflict with society’s
laws and rules, whatever they may be. The consequence of this view is an
“establishment” of sorts, not of religion, but of secularism—a thoroughly
secular state, educational establishment, cultural identity, and system of
laws. The free exercise of religion never requires an exemption or immunity
from any such law. There may be no “free exercise” at variance with the
rules of the secular establishment.
A fair illustration of this post-modern stance toward religious freedom is
present-day France. (Several other European democracies appear to
represent this stance as well.) France forthrightly embraces the idea of a
secular state, and reads its constitutional protections of religious liberty in
this light.36 Recently, France banned the wearing in public of the full-face
veil, or burqa, by Muslim women.37 The explicit justification for this ban is
the value of secularism and community (“fraternity”): the burqa, it is said,
publicly distinguishes one religious community from another, separates that
community from society at large, and “hides the face” in a way offensive to
French communal norms. Occasionally, state interests in security, and in
prohibiting what some think is improper sexism within a religious
community, are invoked as well. But the chief justification for the burqa ban
remains, simply, secularism and society’s interest in suppression of
offensive expressions of a distinctive and communal religious identity.38

36. See 1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social
Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race
or religion.”).
37. See Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdissant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace
public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12,
2010, p. 1; see also Steven Erlanger, France: Full-Face Veil Ban Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/europe/08briefs-France.html?r=1&ref=muslim
veiling.
38. I owe this illustration in part to my participation in a series of public debates in April 2011,
sponsored by the Federalist Society, at Yale Law School, Brown University, and Harvard Law
School, between me and distinguished French constitutional lawyer and public figure Mr. FrancoisHenry Briard, concerning France’s burqa ban, which took effect the week of our debates. I thank
Mr. Briard for that wonderful opportunity and for a series of enlightening and provocative debates.
The position I took in the debates was the same one I take here. I do not mean to disparage France’s
position—at least not unnecessarily—by characterizing it as one of religious intolerance. But I do
disagree with it vigorously, and distinguish it sharply from what I think is the (proper) American
position as reflected in the original meaning of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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This stance—one in which essentially any interest that a deliberative
political majority thinks is important enough to enact into law is sufficient to
prevail over a contrary claim of religious free exercise—is not one that truly
values religious liberty in any serious sense of the term. It contemplates no
sphere of natural right to engage in religious exercise immune from the
cognizance of civil government. The extent of religious freedom is purely a
function of the degree to which government chooses to grant it. Government
may grant such accommodation to religions it thinks harmless to
communitarian interests and deny accommodation to religions, or specific
practices, it thinks harmful. And the range of what constitutes a cognizable
harm to society, permitting suppression specifically of a religious practice, is
extraordinarily broad: anything society disapproves of. This is religious
freedom in name only—a hollow shell. It is, to use a mathematics term, the
“degenerate case” of religious freedom.
Such an approach in practice resembles most closely the pre-liberal
approach of religious intolerance, albeit (arguably) in less virulent form.
The pre-liberal approach is one of religious intolerance, out of a conviction
that religious truth exists, the state knows what that truth is, and competing
visions ought not be tolerated. The religious establishment reigns, and free
exercise of religion inconsistent with established orthodoxy is forbidden and
punished. The post-modern approach is one of religious intolerance, out of a
conviction that religious truth does not exist; the state embraces that secular
orthodoxy and competing visions ought not be tolerated. The secular
establishment reigns, and free exercise of religion inconsistent with
established orthodoxy is—again—forbidden and punished.
Thus the circle is completed. The evolution of progressively different
stances toward the notion of religious truth, and freedom to pursue it, yields
a “progress” in approaches toward religious freedom that, ironically,
eventually returns to where things started.
To reprise: First, religious intolerance out of religious conviction yields
to religious tolerance borne of religious conviction, but coupled with distrust
of government authority. The priority of God’s commands over Man’s leads
no longer to establishment and compulsion, but instead to broader private
liberty, as belief in religious truth produces a public commitment to private
freedom to pursue, and act on, what one believes to be religious truth. The
freedom to obey God, rather than men, is understood as a natural law right to
be free from any government interference with sincere religious exercise.
Next, as society becomes more secular, religious tolerance borne of
religious faith gradually yields to the religious tolerance of a less religious
society, rooted less in faith in God than faith in liberty as a generic secular
proposition. Religious tolerance becomes a function of secular diversity and
the perceived value of personal autonomy generally, rather than religious
conviction specifically. Religious freedom becomes a narrower, less favored
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freedom: non-establishment is emphasized; free exercise of religious beliefs
in particular is harder to sustain when such exercise conflicts with the norms
of secular society.
Finally, the residual religious tolerance of a secular modern society
yields to the religious intolerance of a secular post-modern society, bred of a
different kind of collective certainty about religious propositions: because
religious belief and exercise do not reflect anything real, but merely
capricious (or delusional) personal preference, there is no reason for the
secular state ever to yield to the exercise of religious convictions. The
notion of the priority of God over men is a relic of a bygone age, a legal
fiction, which, even if it were once the foundational premise of religious
liberty, is no longer sustainable or sensible. Free exercise of religion, as a
specially protected freedom, is an embarrassment. The priority of the
secular state—of human society’s law—necessarily trumps any and all mere
private commitments to false beliefs in a (mythical) God.
III. FREEDOM FOR RELIGION: A THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Which of these four stances provides the correct, or best, perspective for
understanding and applying the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?
Which one has the best claim of representing faithfully (so to speak) the
original public meaning of the religious freedom provisions of the U.S.
Constitution—the objective linguistic meaning the words and phrases would
have had, in social and political context, to a reasonably informed speaker
and reader of the English language, at the time and in the place they were
adopted?
That is the task of constitutional interpretation—identifying the original
public meaning of the language of our written Constitution.39 A critical

39. The task of constitutional interpretation is, as I have argued and defended elsewhere, the
search for the objective, original public meaning of the authoritative written text of a constitutional
provision. See Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra
note 30; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) [hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive
Force]; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 291 (2002) [hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?]. The question
of whether one likes or should follow and apply as law the meaning of a constitutional provision is a
different matter—a hermeneutical issue or political decision. Interpretation precedes application and
is a separate enterprise. See Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 910–12, 918–19. The question of whether to apply the original
meaning of the text is, I believe, settled by the Constitution’s text, at least for those who have agreed
to exercise authority under the Constitution and apply it faithfully as law. See generally id. at 864–
72.
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aspect of that task is reading the language of the Constitution in context. To
read the words of the First Amendment Religion Clauses (or any other
constitutional provision) accurately and to apply them faithfully, one must
understand their meaning in the social, political, and linguistic milieu in
which they were written, and seek to ascertain the meaning they would have
had within the community in which they were adopted. Though the
provisions of the Constitution continue to apply today, as a consequence of
the explicit or implicit political decision of today’s society to continue to be
bound by a written Constitution adopted (in the main) many years ago, the
meaning of those provisions is the objective meaning they had at the time
written, not the subjective or anachronistic understanding of any person or
actor today, at variance with that original meaning.40
To read the Religion Clauses in their original sense, and in context, is an
effort to faithfully recover their original meaning, not to substitute
something else for it. It is a search for original linguistic meaning, not an
effort to replace it with an imputed “purpose” alien to the words and usages
of the time. This is an important distinction. The task of constitutional
interpretation is not to identify, or conjure, an abstract “purpose” or
“principle” “behind” (or “underlying”) a constitutional provision and then
interpret and apply that purpose or principle rather than the words
themselves. That is a familiar trick of legal manipulation: reformulate the
text as some abstract proposition loosely thought to flow from the text; take

Some prominent scholars and theorists of the First Amendment Religion Clauses posit that,
to be successful, any interpretation of the Religion Clauses must be one that does not require
acceptance of religious premises—it must be capable of being embraced by believers, atheists, and
agnostics alike. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 313, 316–17 (1996). On this view, an interpretation of the Religion Clauses fails if it
requires the reader to presuppose either “that religion is a good thing [or] that faith is bad or
subordinate to reason.” Id. at 313.
With all due respect, Professor Laycock is confusing interpretation (exegesis of the meaning
of the text) with the “political” decision of what to do with a text—whether and how to appropriate it
for contemporary use (often called “hermeneutics”). Laycock’s proposition is a political one—an
argument about what kinds of interpretations are or should be politically acceptable and sustainable.
But that should be irrelevant to the question of the original meaning and proper understanding—the
correct interpretation—of constitutional language. As I have explained in previous writing, an
interpretation need not be “successful” (in this political sense) to be correct as a matter of
constitutional interpretation:
[I]t need only be sound as a matter of straightforward, non-result driven, textual
interpretation in accordance with the ordinary, common public meaning of the language
employed at the time it was adopted and contemporaneous evidence of the original
understanding and purpose of the provision. The political task should be to persuade
those who find the resulting interpretation unacceptable as a policy matter nonetheless to
accept it as a matter of constitutional law, not to contrive an interpretation to suit those
who may dislike a provision’s natural and intended meaning.
Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 12, at 1613–14 n.39.
40. Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30,
at 858–59, 872–82.
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that proposition and expound (or expand) upon it; then read that proposition
back into the text, substituting the (reformulated) abstract principle for the
actual, original linguistic meaning of the text itself, thereby changing (or
shading) the meaning of the text.41 That, to repeat, is to play tricks with the
text; and that is emphatically not the point of seeking to understand a text’s
context.
The point rather, is that correctly understanding the original public
meaning of a constitutional text requires reading its words in their original
sense and context and avoiding anachronistic readings produced by an
interpreter’s unwitting tendency to read the text through later, modern (or
post-modern) eyes. Original-meaning textualism requires reading texts in
their original sense. That entails embracing, to a certain extent, the general
worldview and premises of the time and place in which they were written
and adopted as part of the Constitution, even if such a worldview and
premises are not ones common to today.
Through whose eyes, then, should we read the words of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses? To the extent that the First Amendment’s
language reflects a worldview under which religious liberty was understood
as a “natural right”—a theological proposition about the origin and nature of
certain rights as being bestowed by God—or an “inalienable right”—a
proposition of political theory concerning absolute or categorical limitations
on the power of the state with respect to rights of such description—that
understanding is highly relevant to correct interpretation and application of
the Religion Clauses. It does not substitute for the text; rather, it assists
faithful interpretation of the text, illuminating the meaning of its words and
concepts (like “free exercise,” “religion,” and “establishment”) and helping
resolve possible ambiguity.
My proposition is that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
reflect the second of the views identified above (the one I call the “liberal”
view). They reflect an essentially religious proposition about the possibility
of religious truth and the priority of God’s real commands over the contrary
requirements of human authority. They emerged from a social, religious,
and political context that regarded religious freedom, within the broad
bounds of plausibly true claims about God, as a natural and inalienable
right—a God-given sphere of liberty over which the state has no proper
jurisdiction. The Religion Clauses reflected broad political recognition too,
of the proposition that duties to God are superior to duties to the state and

41. Id. at 878–79 (describing this as “Lawyers’ Tricks 101” and identifying specific practices
and practitioners fitting the description).
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that the state does not necessarily and reliably reflect God’s will. Such a
theory of the Religion Clauses, I submit, better explains the presence of
these provisions in the Constitution than does any competing theory, and
also sheds light on perennial questions about how they should be interpreted
and applied. In short, understanding religious freedom under the First
Amendment as an inalienable natural right of individuals and groups to act
in sincere obedience to God’s commands, rather than submit to man’s
authority, makes more coherent sense of the Religion Clauses—their text,
their history, their underlying logic and structure—than does any other
view.42
It follows that, in a contest between the dictates of faith and the usual
dictates of law, the First Amendment’s very strong presumption is that it is
the law that ordinarily must yield. That was certainly the dominant,
eighteenth century American view of the priority and obligations of religious
faith: where in conflict, God’s commands trump Man’s.43 More to the point,
the dominant eighteenth century constitutional view was that the state is
obliged to acknowledge the correctness, in principle, of this description of
priorities: for the state, as well as for the church, God’s commands trump
Man’s.
Accordingly, the First Amendment “prefer[s] the sincere
individual’s claim of religious conscience to the government’s claim of
secular authority, absent an extraordinary showing of insincere religion or of
a threat to state interests of the highest order.”44 (And, as I develop below,
the “state interests” that should count as sufficient to prevail over religious
liberty reflect essentially religious premises as well: they more or less track
the set of extreme circumstances in which we are prepared to say, in effect,
that the claim of religious obligation is simply not a true religious claim—
that God did not and does not command or endorse the religious claimant’s
conduct.45)

42.

As I have written elsewhere:
[T]he religion clauses . . . entail a series of essentially religious premises: God exists;
God makes claims on the loyalty of human beings; these claims sometimes require action
that may conflict with government regulation; the claims of God are, for the individual
believer, prior to and superior in obligation to the claims of the state; and—this is the
crucial point—even from the state’s perspective the claims of the state ordinarily should
yield to the claims of God, as sincerely articulated by the religious believer, because the
claims of God rightfully have a stronger claim on human loyalty than do the claims of the
state. . . . The law thinks that God exists and that He makes demands (rules, duties,
prohibitions) on men, and that this reality requires the state to yield.
Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1611.
43. Acts 5:29 (Today’s English Version).
44. Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1610.
45. More on this presently, in Part IV’s discussion of how these general propositions about the
meaning of the Religion Clauses map onto questions of interpretation of the specific phrases of those
clauses. See infra Part IV.
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Except on these essentially religious premises about the reality and
priority of God, the Free Exercise Clause really makes no sense. Assume for
a moment that there is no God—the stance of the third and fourth positions
discussed above. Why on earth would you want to protect religious liberty?
There are perhaps some “soft” reasons: other things being equal, it is nice to
let people act in accordance with their (non-harmful) beliefs whenever
possible, even if one thinks them silly or misguided.46 Granting a sphere of
religious freedom might lessen religious conflict and thereby promote public
peace. Finally, religious belief, even if not justified as true belief, still might
be useful to society, because religious people tend to be good people.
But as noted above (and in my other writing), these arguments do not
provide a sufficient justification for affirmatively protecting the free exercise
of religion in particular, and seemingly none at all for strong protection of
free exercise in the form of exemption of religious conduct from the usual
rules society has seen fit to adopt for its governance. If letting people act on
their beliefs is, generally, a good and nice thing, it is hard to justify religious
liberty specifically as opposed to “liberty” in general—the “free exercise” of
everything. The argument is one for libertarianism, not religious freedom.
After all, what’s so special about religion, if it has no special claim to stating
likely ultimate truth, superior in importance to anything the state requires?
What’s so special about religion, if religious devotion is essentially
indistinguishable from anything else an individual believes, desires, or is
committed to? What justifies religious liberty if the conflicting claim of
conscience, for a religious person, is no different in principle from any other
claim of non-religious conscience? Put more strongly yet: if religion is in
reality delusional, or simply the projection of the individual’s own views
onto a “God” of some sort, why specially protect such delusion? Indeed,
wouldn’t one want to protect it less strongly than non-delusional secular
personal philosophies or strongly held individual views about reality,
society, or politics?
The indulgence of religion as a quaint and good thing quickly runs out
of gas. Why would one ever allow religious claims to prevail over the rules
of society that were otherwise thought good and important rules? Religious
people might (generally) be good people, worthy of respect, but that
justification lacks legs. Why, on such a view, would one ever allow

46. One variation of this, suggested by my designated interlocutor at the conference where this
Article was presented in draft form, Professor Eugene Volokh, is that society as a whole tends to
respect people who hold intense, principled commitments and that religious commitments are often
of such a nature.
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religious people to do things one thought were not good? Religious liberty
thus becomes a theory of allowing religious people to act in conformity with
the state’s laws and rules—freedom to do things that society already thinks
good and proper. Nobody needs a Free Exercise Clause for that.
Presumably, the religious adherent’s conduct has not, in such a situation,
brought him into conflict with society’s rules. A theory of religious liberty
sufficient to explain the inclusion of the Free Exercise Clause in the
Constitution requires some rationale for the decision to disempower
government of its usual powers. While it is not impossible that the Framers
might have written the Free Exercise Clause merely as a way of forbidding
discrimination of religion and protecting the right of religious persons to act
in conformity with laws to which they have no objection, this is a rather
weak explanation for the provision as written. It is even harder to swallow
the proposition that the Framers crafted a provision specifically concerning
toleration of religion more for the sake of tolerance in general than for the
sake of religion in particular.
Finally, as for the idea that religious liberty tends to preserve peace on
earth and goodwill toward all, it is not clear why permitting free exercise of
religion is the right route to such an objective. Exercise of religion—actions
motivated by religion—is precisely the sort of thing that tends to cause
friction in society. Why would one want to protect such conduct if one’s
goal was to keep the peace?47 Wouldn’t it make more sense to protect
simply freedom of belief but not necessarily its exercise? If public peace is
the justification for religious liberty, then certainly one would not wish to
protect any conduct at variance with society’s laws. Permitting free exercise
of religion at variance with the norms of society simply makes no sense from
a keeping-the-peace perspective. And to the extent one is concerned to keep
any religion from waging war on the others, why not just have an
Establishment Clause barring any winner-takes-all rewards for any religion,
and then enforce neutral laws against harm to others? That would probably
be enough to give one religious peace. Who needs the Free Exercise
Clause? It just mucks things up by arguably permitting some obstreperous
conduct. And if “free exercise” of religion were thought to embrace only
things like choice of prayer books, rituals, and church structure, organization
and leadership, the term seems an exceedingly poor choice of words. Why
not then have used the term “freedom of worship”?
The third stance—religious tolerance notwithstanding a culture of
disbelief—does not well explain, or justify, the inclusion of the Religion
Clauses in our Constitution. Nor does it cohere very well with the language
of the provisions themselves. It produces a relatively weak commitment to

47. See HOBBES, supra note 21, at 123 (declaring that the sovereign has the right to determine
and judge what opinions and doctrines are conducive to peace, and thus should be permitted).
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religious liberty in practice and rapidly collapses into the fourth stance:
religious intolerance in a culture of disbelief.48 The mild justifications for
religious liberty, under the third view, collapse when one leans on them with
the least bit of weight. If God does not exist, or if we no longer are willing
to grant as our background premise for interpreting and applying the
Religion Clauses the assumption that God exists, religious liberty as a rule
makes less and less and less sense.49
If the Religion Clauses are to make sense, they must be understood in
the sense and in the social context in which they were originally written.
And so we are left with the original, late-eighteenth century reasons for
religious freedom. Religious freedom, in the sense of categorical protection
of religious conduct from state interference, makes entire sense within an
eighteenth century conception that thinks religion is categorically a good
thing; that religion aims at, and left alone may well hit, something true, vital,
and of the highest importance; and that, because true religion is intrinsically
worth protecting for its own sake, it merits being placed beyond the reach of
society’s usual rules. In short, we protect the core freedom because we
believe it consists of something objectively important and true, and we adopt
an overbroad prophylactic rule for the sake of protecting the core freedom,
even if that means putting up with a lot of pernicious “religious” weeds in
order not to uproot what may end up being the good crop.50

48. The phrase “culture of disbelief” was popularized by Stephen Carter’s excellent book
several years ago. See CARTER, supra note 25, at 23.
49. Commenting on the draft version of this paper at the Pepperdine conference where it was
presented, Professor Volokh noted that the logic of my argument implies that in a “majority
irreligious” nation, where a country does not believe in the notion of true religious propositions, it
should not protect religious freedom. This is almost right: as a descriptive matter, surely, one would
not expect such a society to adopt a constitutional provision generously and genuinely protecting
religious freedom and, if it had earlier adopted one, one would not expect such a society to interpret
and apply even a generously worded provision in a generous, genuinely religion-protective fashion.
(Indeed, this describes many societies’ religious sociology and attendant treatment of religious
liberty, even where written constitutional language is quite religion-protective.) As a normative
matter, however, I would not go so far as to say that such a society should not adopt a protection of
religious liberty. I simply would not expect them to do so.
But all of that is, or should be, beside the point as concerns the original meaning of the
Constitution’s Religion Clauses. Even if one might not expect society today to be as favorably
disposed toward religion and its exercise as it was more than two hundred years ago, that does not
alter the meaning of the constitutional provision that was written and adopted more than two
hundred years ago. See generally Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 875–77, 910–14, 916–19.
50. See supra pp. 1176 (noting that the religious freedom rule aims to protect religious truth
without sweeping in too many of the untrue claims made in the name of religion). For a religious
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That this was essentially the view of religious freedom that animated the
First Amendment Religion Clauses is fairly clear. The difficulty with such a
proposition is not that it is contrary to historical evidence of the original
meaning of the First Amendment; on the contrary, as a matter of history it is
reasonably definite that the Religion Clauses reflect precisely such
premises.51 The difficulty rather is that such a position feels uncomfortable
today. It does not comport with modern sense and modern sensibilities. It
feels anachronistic, jarring, a relic of a bygone era. And in a sense it is: the
original meaning of the Religion Clauses, as a protection of freedom
specifically for religion—for the benefit of religion, for religious exercise,
and for religious persons and groups—does not comport with modern
perceptions of what makes good constitutional policy sense.
What of it? If the task of constitutional interpretation is to recover the
original linguistic sense and meaning of a provision of the Constitution—a
disputed proposition to be sure, but one I take as my starting point here52—
then the fact that what is recovered offends modern sensibilities is really
beside the point. It might mean that we as a society would not today adopt

analogy, consider Jesus’s “Parable of the Weeds,” recorded in Matthew 13:24–30 (Today’s English
Version):
Jesus told them another parable:
The Kingdom of heaven is like this. A man sowed good seed in his field. One night,
when everyone was asleep, an enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat and went
away. When the plants grew and the heads of grain began to form, then the weeds
showed up. The man's servants came to him and said, Sir, it was good seed you sowed in
your field; where did the weeds come from? It was some enemy who did this, he
answered. Do you want us to go and pull up the weeds? they asked him. No, he
answered, because as you gather the weeds you might pull up some of the wheat along
with them. Let the wheat and the weeds both grow together until harvest. Then I will tell
the harvest workers to pull up the weeds first, tie them in bundles and burn them, and
then to gather in the wheat and put it in my barn.
51. The historical case for religious premises animating the Religion Clauses has been well
made by numerous scholars. One of the leading modern legal scholars of the Religion Clauses,
Professor (and former Judge) Michael McConnell, has set forth at length the religious-premises
historical origins of the Religion Clauses, noting in particular the relevance of the Great Awakening
and of resulting religious arguments for religious liberty to understanding the movement for explicit
constitutional protection of religious liberty. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1990). Additional and
similar such evidence has been marshaled by numerous other scholars, regularly producing the same
conclusion over the course of many years. For a sampling of some of the best treatments, see, e.g.,
DONALD DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT (2010); CURRY, supra note 10;
HOWE, supra note 10. In this respect, history confirms intuition. As historian Mark DeWolfe Howe
aptly put it: “Though it would be possible . . . that men who were deeply skeptical in religious
matters should demand a constitutional prohibition against abridgments of religious liberty, surely it
is more probable that the demand should come from those who themselves were believers.” HOWE,
supra note 10, at 15.
52. For a full-throated defense of original-public-meaning-whole-text-in-context-textualism as
the single, correct approach to interpreting the Constitution, see Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 857; see also Kesavan & Paulsen,
Interpretive Force, supra note 39.
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the substance of the Religion Clauses as they were written and understood in
1789. It might mean that modern society should, through some suitable
authoritative act (of constitutional amendment or perhaps revolution) reject
the original meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses as binding
law for us today.53 But it does not alter the meaning of the constitutional
provisions that were in fact enacted many years ago.54 To whatever extent
those provisions continue to be considered binding as law today, it is the
original sense and meaning of those provisions, not modern preferences, that
controls.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
This view of the reason for religious liberty in the American
constitutional system has important implications for understanding the
specific provisions of the Religion Clauses. It “maps” well onto the
language of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, helping
to clarify ambiguities and resolve points of uncertainty or controversy in the
constitutional language in several distinct ways.
First, it points decisively in the direction of the “pro-exemptions” view
of the Free Exercise Clause, by providing a persuasive justification for
adopting the religious perspective of the religious adherent, rather than the
perspective of the indifferent government bureaucrat, in understanding what
constitutes a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.55
Second, it points strongly in the direction of deference to the religious
adherent’s sincere understanding of his religious beliefs and what
constitutes a burden on his free exercise resulting from a requirement of law
preventing, punishing, or penalizing religious conduct.56
Third, it points strongly in the direction of a relatively more narrow,
specific, traditional, arguably theistic understanding of “religion,” as
opposed to looser, modern tendencies to treat any and all belief systems
comparably.57 It does so by providing a coherent basis for understanding the

53. The decision to be bound by (or to continue to be bound by) a written constitution is a
political decision, entirely separate from the question of what that written constitution means.
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 910–
12, 918–19.
54. See supra notes 5152.
55. See infra Part IV.A.1.
56. See infra Part IV.A.2.
57. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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original constitutional meaning of “religion” as grounded in a concern for
certain sorts of belief systems only, and for the specific and unique type of
conflict posed for the religious adherent between the competing claims of
God and of secular law.
Fourth, it favors a narrow view of what might constitute sufficiently
“compelling” reasons for denying a claim of freedom to engage in religious
conduct and supplies a different and ultimately more satisfying justification
for such exceptions as grounded not in the ultimate supremacy of the state
but in the limits of what claims plausibly may be attributed to the commands
of God.58
Fifth and finally, it supports a straightforward reading of the
Establishment Clause as a cognate provision protecting freedom for religious
exercise by prohibiting government coercion or compulsion to engage in
religious exercise, in part flowing from religious premises that true religious
faith cannot result from coercion but only from free inquiry, free persuasion,
and freely-formed conviction.59 The Establishment Clause is not sensibly
read, in context, as an “anti-religion” or “freedom from religion” provision
designed to extirpate religious exercise, observance, or advocacy from the
public civil life of the community. Rather, it is an affirmative protection of
religious liberty that complements the Free Exercise Clause by categorically
ousting the coercive power of the state in matters of religious exercise.
In what follows, I develop each of these points in the context of
considering the specific language of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
The first four points fall under the heading of the Free Exercise Clause, the
fifth point under the Establishment Clause.
A. The Free Exercise Clause as a Substantive Freedom—For Religion
1. “. . . no law prohibiting . . .”
The Free Exercise Clause bans federal laws (and, by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, state and local laws) “prohibiting” the free exercise
of religion.60 Perhaps the central question of Free Exercise Clause
interpretation is the meaning of “law prohibiting.” Does it refer only to laws
that, by their terms, regulate religious practice specifically? That is, is the
clause one that forbids only those requirements of law that specifically target
or discriminate against religious practice because it is religious practice?

58. See infra Part IV.A.4.
59. See infra Part IV.B.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on the powers
of state governments).
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The position that answers this question “yes” may be called the “nondiscrimination rule” reading.
Or, does it, in addition, forbid the imposition of legal requirements that
have the effect of punishing, penalizing, or preventing free religious
exercise, whether government is intentionally targeting religious practice or
not? That is, does the clause create (or recognize) an affirmative,
substantive right to engage in religious exercise, free from government’s
usual powers to legislate through otherwise neutral laws? This may be
called the “substantive right” or “exemptions” reading. In short, is the Free
Exercise Clause about what government is aiming at with its laws (the nondiscrimination rule reading) or about what it hits (the effects, or substantive
right reading)?
The language of the Free Exercise Clause, standing alone, arguably
could be read either way. How does one resolve the ambiguity? One
answer is to move next to other, second-best evidence of constitutional
meaning, such as historical evidence concerning probable original intention
or understanding.61 Another answer, typically employed only if neither text
nor history resolves the issue, is to default to the principle that if the text
does not forbid government action, there is no sufficient basis for concluding
that any definite constitutional rule invalidates the action.62 These are both
legitimate next-step moves, and in the case of the Free Exercise Clause they
tend to point in opposing directions. History strongly supports the proexemptions reading;63 a default rule of government power of course supports
the narrower, anti-discrimination-rule-only reading (the approach and
conclusion of Employment Division v. Smith).64

61. Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note 39, at 1148–83 (historical evidence
provides worthy second-best evidence of original public meaning); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, Is
West Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra note 39, at 363–95 (similar).
62. Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30,
at 878–82.
63. See McConnell, supra note 51. Though McConnell’s evidence represents, in my estimation,
the best treatment of the historical evidence on this issue, it should be noted that there are important
competing accounts. See Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).
64. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (“As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given
that [exemptions] meaning.”). Smith proceeded from this observation of textual ambiguity not to
history, nor straight to a default rule of government power, but to a consideration of precedent: “Our
decisions reveal that the latter [non-discrimination] reading is the correct one. We have never held
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” Id. at 878–79. The Smith Court’s treatment of
precedent as uniformly supporting its interpretation is extraordinarily tendentious, bordering on
dishonest, as nearly all commentators agree. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
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Might an understanding of the broader logic and structure of the Free
Exercise Clause—the sense of the reasons for its inclusion in the First
Amendment, the sense of the correct paradigm of religious liberty of the four
discussed, the sense of religious liberty as a pre-constitutional natural and
inalienable right—help resolve the ambiguity, tilting the conclusion
decisively in one direction rather than another?
I believe so. If the Free Exercise Clause is read from a non-religious
perspective, one of utter indifference to (or mild hostility toward) religious
exercise and skepticism about the value of religious devotion as anything
other than personal preference, then the more “natural” sense of the
language might seem to be that it is a nondiscrimination rule, not a
substantive immunity. If religious freedom is understood not as a natural
right preceding the social compact of government but as a liberty conferred
by human governmental authority under a written constitution, it is natural
to read the right through the lens of governmental authority.
If, however, the Free Exercise Clause is read from a perspective that
assumes that religious exercise is a natural, literally God-given, inalienable
right, accorded constitutional protection because of its presumed intrinsic
worth and priority over the commands of secular government, it is more
natural to read “prohibiting” as referring to a law’s consequences for a
sincere religious believer. From the perspective that credits the possibility
that there is such a thing as a God whose commands have priority, and that
takes as its starting point the proposition that religious freedom is the state’s
recognition of the strong presumptive validity of that ordering of priorities, it
makes little sense to read the Free Exercise Clause as anything other than
ousting state authority over the believer’s conduct, wherever and whenever
such state authority is in genuine conflict with genuine religious obligation.
To read the Free Exercise Clause not as recognizing a substantive right but
as merely stating a non-discrimination rule would largely fail to serve the
purposes for which the right presumably exists. Moreover, it would permit
government to circumvent religious freedom seemingly at will, by the
artifice of crafting its legal rules in ostensibly general, religion-neutral
language. For example: “all citizens must eat pork.”65 “Everyone must be

Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 n.3 (1991) (remarking that Smith’s “use of precedent
borders on fiction” even while defending its revisionist reading of the Free Exercise Clause);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109 (1990); Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 251 n.8.
65. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Obama’s Contraception Cram-Down: The Pork Precedent,
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.thepublicdisclosure.com/2012/02/4777 (citing
ancient religious texts recounting emperor Antioches Epiphanes IV “neutral” command that all
persons, including Jews, publicly eat pork).
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available to work on all days of the week to qualify.”66 “Every employer
must provide health insurance coverage for employees that includes
contraception and abortion.”67
The religious perspective of the Religion Clauses strongly suggests that
the “substantive right” or “exemptions” reading is the correct one. It goes a
long way in the direction of clarifying the linguistic ambiguity of the Free
Exercise Clause, by indicating which general stance with respect to religious
liberty is the preferred one from which to view the clause. Taken together
with other evidence of original meaning, including historical evidence
supporting the understanding that freedom of religious exercise was
understood at the time of the framing as contemplating religion-specific
exemptions from general laws,68 it indicates that the general rule of
Employment Division v. Smith, that neutral laws of general applicability
ordinarily cannot be taken to violate the Free Exercise Clause rights of
individuals and groups, is simply wrong. Smith makes a certain amount of
sense if the “modern” stance toward religious liberty is right.69 It makes
little or no sense if the “liberal” stance is correct.70
2. “. . . the free exercise . . .”
It is often said, almost as a throwaway line, that, under the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause, freedom of religious belief is “absolute,”
but in the nature of things, freedom of religious conduct cannot be.71 What
is interesting, however, is that the Free Exercise Clause says nothing about
belief in and of itself. It speaks solely in terms of the exercise of religion.
Freedom of belief seems to have been assumed—so much taken for granted,
perhaps, that the First Amendment does not even need to speak of it.

66. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“The ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition
of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”).
67. The issue of compelled inclusion of contraception, sterilization, and abortion drugs as
“preventive health care” where employers offer health insurance coverage to employees is, as of the
time of this writing, very much a live controversy. See Paulsen, Obama’s Contraception CramDown, supra note 65.
68. See McConnell, supra note 51.
69. See supra Part II.C.
70. See supra Part II.B.
71. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“The [First] Amendment
embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be.”); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990).
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Religious belief is either not protected (which would be a rather surprising
conclusion) or, more likely, subsumed within the broader category of free
exercise, as an a fortiori case: believing is itself a religious activity, an
exercise of religion. If government may not prohibit religious exercise, it
surely cannot prohibit religious belief, the “lesser-included” predicate
conduct, as it were.
The larger point is that the text of the First Amendment does not treat
religious belief and conduct differently, the former absolutely protected and
the other qualified or limited. It treats them alike and provides, simply, a
right to their “free exercise.” Whatever the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause’s right, whether a non-discrimination proviso or a substantive right or
immunity, the thing it protects is religious action—activity, exercise. The
Free Exercise right is a right to engage in conduct—conduct attributable to
religious motivations or beliefs. This plain-language reading should not be
at all troubling from a linguistic perspective. Moreover, it coheres
particularly well with the conception of religious freedom as being
specifically about protecting religion because the true commands of God are
of superior obligation to the commands of human society. If one held such a
conception, one would want a religious freedom provision that protected
religious exercise, not just belief. Freedom to believe is not enough. For the
believer, there must be freedom to act in accordance with belief.
By the same token, if one held the more religion-skeptical, “modern”
view of the justification for religious liberty—that religion should be
tolerated, along with and on the same terms as other belief systems, for
general reasons of tolerating individual beliefs wherever possible,
notwithstanding general disbelief in God—then one probably would want a
constitutional religious freedom provision that emphasized freedom of
belief, broadly conceived, but that de-emphasized freedom of action
(exercise). In short, one would want a constitutional provision that really
does say what more modern judicial decisions have sloppily interpreted the
Free Exercise Clause to say: that freedom of belief is absolute and freedom
of action in its nature is not.72 One would also want a religious freedom
provision that de-emphasized the “religious” nature of the freedom. The fact
that the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of religious exercise
specifically, rather than belief, thus subtly tends to buttress the religiousliberty-for-the-sake-of-religion paradigm and the interpretive conclusions
that follow from it.
The Free Exercise Clause says, further, that the right to religious
exercise is the right to its “free” exercise, a word choice suggesting that legal
restrictions or burdens of any kind on the exercise of religion are forbidden.

72.
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For a time in the 1980s, before the decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, the U.S. Department of Justice took the position that the word
“prohibiting” in the Free Exercise Clause meant that small-ish burdens on
religious exercise, not wholly preventing its exercise, were allowed.73 Such a
position of course gives little or no weight to the word “free” in the Free
Exercise Clause. Viewed from the perspective that religious liberty exists
precisely to protect the priority of religious obligation over secular authority,
however, so narrow a reading of what counts as “prohibiting” the “free
exercise” of religion becomes hard to sustain. The more natural reading of
the whole text, in linguistic and historical context, is that it forbids
government from imposing any punishment, penalty, or privation that
operates meaningfully to impair the religious adherent’s ability to comply
with the dictates of faith, as the religious adherent understands those
dictates. Moreover, whether and to what degree the ability to act
consistently with one’s faith is meaningfully impaired by the state’s action
is, similarly, a question of the religious adherent’s understanding of the
impact such a legal requirement has on his or her ability to act faithfully.74

73. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 115053, REPORT TO THE ATT’Y
GEN.: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 7 (1986); see, e.g., Brief for United
States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (No. 85-993).
74. This is generally in accord with pre-Smith doctrinal treatments. The classic case for the
proposition that it is the religious adherent’s understanding of the requirements of his faith that
counts, not the state’s view of what the adherent’s faith requires and whether or not it is burdened by
the state’s action, is Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S.
707 (1981). In Thomas, the government had urged that the religious claimant’s beliefs were not
principled or consistent and, further, that they did not conform to any specific command of a given
church, denomination, or sect. Id. at 714–15. The Court held, rightly, that this did not matter. Id. at
716. While the Free Exercise Clause only protects beliefs “rooted in religion” and not in purely
secular or personal philosophical beliefs, the protection of religious beliefs does not “turn upon a
judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.” Id. at 713–14. Nor did it matter that other members of Thomas’s faith (Jehovah’s
Witnesses) might not share his specific religious objection. Id. at 715. “Intrafaith differences of that
kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed,” the Court said, and it is not for
government officials (including courts) to judge such matters of scriptural or doctrinal interpretation.
Id. at 715–16. On the contrary, “the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are
shared by all of the members of a religious sect.” Id. “We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line,
and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his
position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more
sophisticated person might employ.” Id. at 715.
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3. “. . . religion . . .”
But what counts as “religion?” If the premises justifying constitutional
religious liberty imply that the state generally must defer to an individual’s
understanding of what his faith requires of him, does that mean, further, that
the Free Exercise Clause immunity extends to anything and everything an
individual sincerely calls or considers his “religion?” Does it mean, further
yet, that any and all strongly held personal beliefs—those that might
resemble (in certain ways) traditional religious beliefs and that might be held
with similar intensity and tenacity—must be treated as falling within the
Constitution’s protection for the free exercise of “religion,” whether the
individual considers such beliefs religious or not and irrespective of whether
they fit the paradigm of the state recognizing and yielding to the presumed a
priori priority of God?
This is the slippery slope down which the modern Supreme Court slid, a
long way, in a series of cases in the 1960s and 1970s involving claims of
conscientious exemption to the military draft.75 The slide in many ways
perfectly characterizes the “modern” stance toward religious freedom: there
is nothing particularly distinctive about religious ethical claims. Thus, not
only must “religion” therefore be construed broadly, but also analogous nonreligious ethical claims need to be treated comparably, lest religion be
preferred to non-religion. The slide also accounts, to a fair degree, for the
decline of aggressive protection of the free exercise of religion in the
modern era.76
The first case in this line was United States v. Seeger, decided in 1965.77
At issue was whether Mr. Seeger satisfied the federal statutory standard for
conscientious exemption from compulsory service for persons categorically
opposed to war in any form, by virtue of “religious training and belief.”78
The Court counted Mr. Seeger’s self-styled “religious” belief in “goodness
and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed,” as close enough (for government purposes) to satisfy the statutory
standard.79 Seeger considered his ethical beliefs “religious”—he put
quotation marks around the term in the military’s registration form—and
that satisfied the Court,80 notwithstanding the statute’s specific definition of
religious belief as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being

75. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
76. I have used the draft exemption cases to illustrate a similar point in prior writing. Paulsen,
Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1617–20.
77. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
78. Id. at 165.
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. at 187.
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involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation” and not
including “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.”81
The Court in Seeger adopted the following spin on the statutory
language: “[t]he test might be stated in these words: [a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
comes within the statutory definition.”82 Thus, for statutory purposes
(though the decision obviously had constitutional overtones as well), the
Court deemed “religion” to include “sincere and meaningful” beliefs
“parallel” to traditional religious theistic belief systems, as long as the
believer considered such beliefs religious.83
Then came Welsh v. United States, in 1970, the next case in a law
professor’s perfect series of hypotheticals.84 Mr. Welsh considered his
beliefs not to be religious and struck out the word “religious” on the form.85
But he still objected to participating in war in any form.86 What result now?
(As an aside, it is worth noting that an awful lot had happened between 1965
and 1970 in American public life and law. The Vietnam War had become
substantially more unpopular; draft evasion, in various legal and illegal
forms, had become common. Public draft card burning had become a
notorious form of protest, addressed in a major Supreme Court decision
interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.87 Robert
Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated in 1968. The
nation had experienced severe and violent riots, including many over the
Vietnam War. And a general cultural revolution against traditional values
and authority was well underway.88)
The Court in Welsh expanded the definition of religion to embrace nonreligious beliefs.89 A four-Justice plurality voted to repaint the statute so that

81. Id. at 165 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)).
82. Id. at 176.
83. Id. at 166, 176.
84. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
85. Id. at 337.
86. Id. at 343.
87. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of
statute forbidding destruction, including burning, of draft cards, against challenge that it violated the
Free Speech Clause).
88. For an early, but still classic, social history of the period, see WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, COMING
APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1960’S (1969). For a classic treatment in song, see DON
MCLEAN, AMERICAN PIE (United Artists 1971).
89. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343–44.
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“religious” meant, in effect, “either religious or non-religious,” on the theory
that Welsh’s case was essentially indistinguishable from Seeger on its facts
and that Seeger had already pretty much adopted such a position.90 “What is
necessary under Seeger,” the plurality said, is that the registrant’s opposition
to war “stem from” “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right
and wrong and that those beliefs be held with the strength of traditional
religious convictions.”91 Thus, “[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from . . . war,”
those beliefs “function as a religion in his life” and entitle him to
conscientious objector status as much as someone whose views flow from
religious convictions.92 As for Welsh’s explicit disclaimer that his views did
not stem from religious belief, the Court held that this did not matter so
much after all.93 Mr. Welsh had simply erred in thinking that his ethical
views did not count as “religious” within the meaning of the statute, at least
as construed by the Court. (He apparently had not read Seeger carefully.94)
Justice Harlan could not stomach such a pretense and declined to join
the plurality’s statutory interpretation holding.95 Nonetheless, he provided
the fifth vote in Welsh’s favor, arguing that extension of draft exemption to
nonreligious claimants was necessary to avoid what he thought otherwise
would be a violation of the Establishment Clause.96 Limiting the exemption
“to those opposed to war in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul” of
the First Amendment, Harlan wrote.97 Taking as his starting point the
proposition that the Free Exercise Clause did not require exemptions for
religious conduct—Harlan acknowledged that he had been a dissenter in
Sherbert v. Verner and that he adhered to that dissenting view with respect
to the Court’s Free Exercise Clause doctrine at the time98—he concluded that
government, “having chosen to exempt, . . . cannot draw the line between

90. See id.
91. Id. at 339–40 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 340.
93. Id. at 341.
94. The attempt to distinguish Seeger, the plurality wrote, “fails for the reason that it places
undue emphasis on the registrant’s interpretation of his own beliefs.” Id. Because “very few
registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in [the statute],” it
followed that “a registrant’s statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide”
to whether they are religious or not. Id.
95. See id. at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 357–58.
97. Id. at 345.
98. Id. at 356 (citing his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). Sherbert held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids government from conditioning a
benefit (in that case, unemployment compensation benefits) on conduct inconsistent with an
individual’s exercise of her sincerely-held religious beliefs, absent demonstrated threat to interests of
the highest order. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409–10.
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theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on
the other.”99 Even if the statute could be construed to embrace “non-theistic
religions,” it still “draws the line between religious and nonreligious” and,
that “in my view offends the Establishment Clause.” 100
This had been the thrust of the arguments in the lower courts, in both
Seeger’s and Welsh’s cases—that protecting religious conscientious
objections (and specifically theistic beliefs) but not protecting non-religious
conscientious objections was illegitimate and unconstitutional. Behind this,
of course, was the modern, skeptical view of the nature of religious belief
and the resulting modern stance toward religious freedom: toleration, in so
far as practical, of beliefs of all kinds, irrespective of their provenance.
Non-religious belief systems needed to be treated the same as religious
belief systems, as a basic principle of religious freedom, because, as the
Second Circuit put it in Seeger, “today, a pervading commitment to a moral
ideal is for many the equivalent of what was historically considered the
response to divine commands.”101
Harlan could not swallow the plurality’s cramming of the modern stance
on “religion” into the statutory language.102 But he swallowed it whole as
constitutional reasoning.103 On that ground, he joined in engrafting onto the
statute a provision for conscientious exemption of non-religious
individuals.104 For Harlan, constitutional religious liberty not only did not
require exemption of individuals from laws that conflicted with their goodfaith understanding of God’s prior and superior commands, it forbade
exemption of religion specifically in preference to non-religious beliefs.105
Religious freedom, in short, meant that religion and non-religion had to be
treated the same way.106 The plurality had come to this conclusion in the
guise of statutory construction; Harlan’s opinion embraced the same result
explicitly as constitutional law.
Seeger and Welsh, though in form statutory decisions, amounted to a
minor revolution in the constitutional treatment of religion. As I have put it

99. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 357.
101. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
102. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 357–58.
104. Id. at 358.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 361 (“To conform with the requirements of the First Amendment’s religious
clauses as reflected in the mainstream of American history, legislation must, at the very least, be
neutral.”).
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elsewhere, “their one-two punch has cast a long shadow over the Court’s
religion clause jurisprudence.”107 The logic of their holdings is that any
serious accommodation of religious conscience constitutionally must
embrace analogous claims of non-religious conscience.108
The third case in the draft exemption trilogy, Gillette v. United States,
was decided in 1971, the year after Welsh.109 Two rather different claimants
argued for a right to selective conscientious objection—a moral objection
not to all wars but only to certain “unjust” ones.110 The statute did not
extend so far, but only protected those who opposed participation in war in
any form.111 One of the two claimants was a clearly religious Roman
Catholic who adhered to Catholic “just war” doctrine, which explicitly
differentiates a Christian’s conscientious moral duty in different types of war
situations.112 The other was a Seeger-Welsh-style non-religious ethical
objector to the Vietnam War in particular as an unjust war.113 To the modern
perspective, of course, the situations appeared identical. And the one thing
that seemed clear from the outset in Gillette, given Seeger and Welsh, was
that the two claims would be resolved the same way.
The Court rejected both claims.114 This was not very surprising: given
increased opposition to the Vietnam War, and to the draft, accommodation
of essentially all claims to conscientious objection to the draft came to be
seen by the Court as intolerable.115 In the political and social context, and
given the premises of Seeger and Welsh, it would in effect mean the
evisceration of the draft. The power to conscript for military service in an
increasingly unpopular war would be subject to the individual veto of the
putative draftee, a result desired by none of the justices (save Justice
Douglas, in lone and perpetual dissent over anything involving the

107. Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1618.
108. The Court has not been perfectly consistent on this point. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (“Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the
Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in
religious belief.”); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005) (“[R]eligious accommodations
need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular entities.’” (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987))).
109. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
110. Id. at 439, 441.
111. Id. at 443.
112. Id. at 441.
113. Id. at 439.
114. Id. at 463.
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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government’s power with respect to the Vietnam War).116 Under such
circumstances, protection of all individual claims of conscience became too
much weight for the Free Exercise Clause to bear. And so the Court beat a
hasty retreat from the aggressive protection of religious (and non-religious)
conscience.
The Court’s discussion is revealing. To protect just-war conscientious
objection, for religious and non-religious persons alike, would embrace “[a]
virtually limitless variety of beliefs.”117 Ordinary “dissent from policy”
might “appear as the concrete basis of an objection that has roots as well in
conscience and religion.”118 Sorting the two would be nearly impossible.
“Moreover, the belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by
its nature changeable and subject to nullification by changing events.”119
The claim is “ultimately subjective, depending on the claimant’s view of the
facts in relation to his judgment that a given factor or congeries of factors
colors the character of the war as a whole.”120
Accommodating such “ultimately subjective” claims of conscience was
especially unconscionable given the diversity of religious and secular claims
of morality: “[o]urs is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of
political views, moral codes, and religious persuasions.”121 To grant all such
claims was to the Court unthinkable—impractical and extreme—but to grant
some but not others was just as unthinkable, for different reasons: it could
produce “religious discrimination.”122 “[A] claim’s chances of success
would be greater the more familiar or salient the claim’s connection with
conventional religiosity could be made to appear,” the Court added, citing

116. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, of course, had dissented
vehemently and regularly from the claimed authority of the Executive Branch to wage the Vietnam
War at all, in cases presenting the issue—and in cases not presenting the issue, but involving
individual acts of protest and resistance. See Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (majority denying certiorari for a draft challenge); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
414 U.S. 1316 (1973) (Douglas, J.) (lifting stay of injunction against use of armed force in
Cambodia); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
leave to file complaint) (collecting Douglas’s other opinions asserting the unconstitutionality of the
Vietnam War); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from decision upholding conviction for draft card burning against First Amendment free
speech challenge, asserting that question of Vietnam War’s constitutionality was a question that
needed to be resolved).
117. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 455.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 456.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 457.
122. Id. (noting the danger of “unintended religious discrimination”).
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the Establishment Clause and recent decisions made under it.123 “While the
danger of erratic decisionmaking unfortunately exists in any system of
conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the
dangers would be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate
scope were honored in theory.”124
The Free Exercise Clause never fully recovered from the cumulative
effect of the draft exemption cases. The pro-exemptions view made a brief
comeback the next year, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, upholding the right of Amish
communities to discontinue formal schooling past the eighth grade.125 But
Yoder soon came to be regarded as the exceptional case, with further
exemptions on Free Exercise Clause grounds largely limited in Supreme
Court cases, to claims involving unemployment compensation, until even
that string was broken in Employment Division v. Smith.126

123. Id.
124. Id. at 458. One can hear distinct echoes of Gillette in the Court’s decision and opinion in
Employment Division v. Smith, two decades later:
Any society adopting such a system [of requiring individual religious exemptions from
laws of general applicability] would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in
direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to
coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made
up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” . . . and precisely because
we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct
that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
494 U.S. 872, 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Gillette shared the premises of the majority that accommodating
religion necessarily meant accommodating a virtually limitless number and diversity of secular
claims for religious conscientious exemption. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
He simply would have granted exemption to all, rather than withholding it from all: “Conscience is
often the echo of religious faith. But, as this case illustrates, it may also be the product of travail,
meditation, or sudden revelation related to a moral comprehension of the dimensions of a problem,
not to a religion in the ordinary sense.” Id. at 466. The two situations, for Douglas, had to be treated
the same way. The exemption statute, as written, “is a species of those which show an invidious
discrimination in favor of religious persons and against others with like scruples.” Id. at 468.
Government, he argued, had to be neutral between religious belief and other belief. Id. at 468–69.
125. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
126. Sherbert v. Verner is the leading modern case for the broad view of the Free Exercise Clause
as requiring exemptions for religion from laws of general applicability. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Sherbert held that a state could not condition eligibility for unemployment compensation, as applied
to a Saturday Sabbath observer, on being available for work six days a week (including Saturday).
Id. at 410. Free Exercise Clause claims for religious-specific exemption from nominally neutral
unemployment compensation rules were similarly upheld in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana
Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission
of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
Even that string ended with Employment Division v. Smith, which rejected a claim for
unemployment compensation for a person who was unemployed by virtue of religious conduct in
conflict with state criminal drug-use rule. 494 U.S. 490 (1990).
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012),
the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Free Exercise Clause requires that churches’ decisions
with respect to the hiring and firing of ministers be exempt from facially neutral employment
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The essential problem—a problem that continues to bedevil religious
freedom today—is that to define “religion” within the meaning of the
Constitution (or federal statutes) as embracing essentially any strongly-held
comprehensive personal or community belief system is to drain the term of
meaning. Doing so wrenches the word “religion” from its original
constitutional and social context and gives it a new, ahistorical modern
meaning more in harmony with the modern stance toward religious freedom
as protecting freedom and personal beliefs, generally. The result, ultimately,
is not to bring all personal beliefs up to the level of protection accorded
genuine exercise of religious faith, but to bring truly religious beliefs down
to the level of protection accorded all personal beliefs—which is, to put
them at the mercy of popular will. Ironically, “defining” (if that is the right
word) “religion” so broadly as to include most everything under the sun ends
up reading the Free Exercise Clause out of the Constitution, at least insofar
as it is thought an affirmative, substantive individual liberty.
The correct answer depends, I submit, on the correct paradigm. We
protect religious liberty on the premise that God is real and that the true
priorities of God trump the ordinary commands of man. We do not protect
secular conscience, generally, in the same way, because the nature of the
conflict between an individual’s own personal ethical views and the
requirements of the state is not the same thing. The nature of religious
obligation is intrinsically different from philosophical or moral belief
systems that involve no conception of a transcendent Creator, God. The
believer understands himself to be under the superior authority of God. The
ethical humanist, secularist, or atheist does not; he does not believe in God.
Rather, he is subject to the moral commands he discerns for himself. (In a
very real sense, the atheist is “God” for himself, the only ultimate authority
over his own conscience. He really is, in Smith’s words, “a law unto
himself.”127) To assume that these situations are the same, to treat them as
rough equivalents, is to deny the most basic premise on which American

discrimination laws: “[T]he Free Exercise Clause . . . protects a religious group’s right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointments.” Id. at 697. The Court noted that, as in Smith, the
statute at issue was neutral and generally applicable, but distinguished Smith on its facts: “It is true
that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, is a valid and
neutral law of general applicability. But a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s
ingestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The
present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that
affects the faith and mission of the church itself.” Id. at 707.
127. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1879)).
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religious freedom rests and to render the protection specifically of the free
exercise of religion linguistically (as well as theologically) unintelligible.
The word “religion,” in the original sense of the term employed by the
Constitution (and still in common usage today), necessarily involves some
sort of conception of God (or gods) and the obligations of man and
restrictions on conduct thought to flow from rightful devotion to the prior
and superior claims of God. It is, necessarily, “something more than just the
projection of an individual’s inner sense of self, value, ethics, or morals, or
of a social, political, or moral philosophy that involves no such transcendent
reality or creative force.”128
As I have written elsewhere, there is probably no better operational
definition of “religion” in this constitutional sense than the one supplied by
the original Virginia Declaration of Rights and employed by James Madison
in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments: religion
is “the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging
it.”129 (This is not direct “legislative history” of the meaning of the First
Amendment. But it is good contemporaneous evidence of common public
usage of the term “religion” at or about the time the Constitution was
adopted.130) The statutory military draft-exemption definition, before the
Supreme Court got hold of it, was remarkably similar to that early definition:
“an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including]
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code.”131
That statutory definition, in turn, can trace its origins to the outstanding
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh,
which the statute fairly copies.132 Indeed, Hughes’s opinion in Macintosh is
an eloquent defense of American religious freedom as fundamentally rooted
in the priority of an individual’s duties to God. Hughes was dissenting from
the majority’s holding that an applicant for naturalized citizenship could be
rejected for refusal on religious grounds to promise in advance to bear arms
in defense of the United States:
Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be
recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts with convictions of

128. Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1621–22.
129. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (quoting in the appendix
the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
130. See Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note 39, at 1144–48, 1156–59 (noting
how contemporaneous documentary evidence can provide important evidence of word usage, and
sometimes even serve as a “concordance” of constitutional meaning).
131. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)).
132. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 627–35 (1931) (Hughes, J., dissenting).
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duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within the
domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws
regardless of scruples. When one’s belief collides with the power
of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or
punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a
moral power higher than the state has always been maintained. The
reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle,
would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and
law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a relation
to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation. . . . One cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper
appreciation of its essential and historic significance, without
assuming the existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will
of God. Professor Macintosh, when pressed by the inquiries put to
him, stated what is axiomatic in religious doctrine. And, putting
aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of
conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of
paramount duty. The battle for religious liberty has been fought and
won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in
conflict with good order, upon the very ground of the supremacy of
conscience within its proper field. . . . There is abundant room for
enforcing the requisite authority of law as it is enacted and requires
obedience, and for maintaining the conception of the supremacy of
law as essential to orderly government, without demanding that
either citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume by oath an
obligation to regard allegiance to God as subordinate to allegiance
to civil power.133
The original, religious understanding of the word “religion” as meaning
what traditionally would have been understood to be embraced by the word
“religion” in 1789, obviously possesses a strong textual and contextual claim
to represent the original meaning of the term. The only problem with such
an understanding—if it really is a problem—is that it does not fit well with
modern sensibilities, which are better reflected by the decisions in Seeger
and Welsh.134 But those decisions make hash of the word “religion” and they
make hash of the reasons why the Constitution distinctively protects the free
exercise of religion. They also, unwittingly, end up narrowing the sphere of

133.
134.

Id. at 633–34.
See supra pp. 11961200
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religious liberty, not broadening it (as Gillette and, eventually, Smith
show).135 As un-modern, archaic, and ungenerous as it may strike modern
sensibilities, the word “religion” in the Religion Clauses simply does not
bear the modern interpretations that have been forced upon it. “Religion” is
adherence and devotion to the priority of God. Seeger and Welsh—and onehalf of Gillette—are wrong.
4. The Problem of Exceptional Harm: Implied Exceptions and What
Might Justify Them
A consequence of all this is that the Free Exercise Clause, within its
sphere (of actually religious exercise), presumptively confers a substantive
freedom from government regulation, for religious conduct—an immunity
from the usual rules of society. But can the Free Exercise Clause really
mean so much?136 What of the problem of exceptional harm—the situation
where religious conduct imposes essentially intolerable harms on others, or
grave dangers of such harms? Would we really permit Abraham to commit
human sacrifice of his son, Isaac, out of perceived obedience to God and
excuse the murder of a child from criminal liability on the basis of the Free
Exercise Clause?137
Judicial doctrine prior to Employment Division v. Smith, and still for
certain claims even after Smith as well as under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA),138 traditionally has handled this problem with a

135. See supra pp. 12001204.
136. This is the form of the question posed by Stephen Pepper, in his insightful article on the Free
Exercise Clause several years ago. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously,
1986 BYU L. REV. 299.
137. See Genesis 22 (Today’s English Version). Abraham, of course, did not sacrifice Isaac, but
was apparently prepared to do so in obedience to God’s command. Genesis 22:1–10 (Today’s
English Version). This was good enough for God (or what God wanted in the first place), and Isaac
was spared. Genesis 22:11–19 (Today’s English Version).
138. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). Smith preserved the compelling interest
standard for free exercise claims involving challenges to denials of exemption claims where the law
or rule in question provides individualized accommodation or application in other respects. See id.
at 884. Smith also preserved where a free exercise claim is made in combination with some other
plausible constitutional claims, such as a substantive due process “parental freedom” claim or a free
speech claims. See id. at 881–82. Whether these exceptions to Smith’s rule make any principled
sense can be (and has been) doubted. See Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 251
n.8 (collecting commentary to this effect). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) adopts
the compelling interest standard for all applications of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006); see
generally Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5. The RFRA applies that same standard to
state law, but the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked power to prescribe such a rule, in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress responded with the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, (RLUIPA), which provides for application of the compelling interest
standard in challenges to state laws in certain prescribed areas falling within Congress’s power to
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“compelling state interest” escape hatch: a sufficiently compelling, or
“paramount” state interest “of the highest order and . . . not otherwise
served” trumps even sincere claims to religious exercise.139 As a matter of
the constitutional text, the problem remains that there is no compellinginterest override written into the Free Exercise Clause; it is all judicial
interpolation.
How can such an exception be justified as proper
constitutional interpretation? (And does this not tend to suggest that the
broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause, which would necessitate such an
implied exception, is wrong in the first place?) Further, as a matter of the
underlying theory explaining the Religion Clauses as rooted in the idea of
the priority of God’s commands over man’s and the disability of the state to
judge to the contrary, why should “compelling state interests”—as
determined by the state, according to some nonreligious moral or political
metric—suddenly trump religious claims? If one grants the premise that we
protect religious liberty because what is at stake are truly God’s commands
or expectations, and that these really do prevail over man’s moral law at
variance with God’s commands, why shouldn’t Abraham win, in principle?
After all, the Biblical account states that God really did command Abraham
to kill his son, and only repented once it was clear that Abraham had passed
the test of absolute loyalty to God and indeed was prepared to carry out
God’s horrific command.140
In short, does not the concession to compelling, overriding interests
contradict the initial premise on which, as I have argued, religious freedom
rests?
The problem is a serious one, but one capable of being answered both in
terms of the constitutional text and the underlying priority-of-God religious
premises of the Religion Clauses. Consider for a moment the types of things
that lie at the core of what are generally thought to be “compelling”
interests. Set to one side the fact that governments tend to regard everything
they do—all official policies and rules—as compelling, a view that, if
credited, would render the Free Exercise Clause essentially meaningless.141

regulate interstate commerce and to attach conditions to the receipt of federal expenditures. 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
139. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“The essence of all that has been said
and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“[I]n this highly sensitive area, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation [of religious liberty].”).
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141. See generally Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 250–51.
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Paradigmatic compelling interests include: protection of human life
from such grave harms as murder; rape; robbery; theft; slavery; infanticide;
abortion; oppression; violent attacks from others of all kinds; falsity, perjury,
or fraud to the injury of another and, arguably, some other kinds of very
serious threats or injury to life, liberty, or even property of another.
(Conduct posing a sufficiently serious threat or likelihood of such injuries is
also, typically, regarded as presenting compelling justification for overriding
religious liberty.) Typically excluded from such lists are purported harms of
an individual to himself or herself as a consequence of sincere religious
conviction. By extension, harms purely internal to a religious community,
i.e. those harms that do not involve injury to non-consenting third parties
outside the community; purported harms to third parties that are either
relatively minor or that involve injuries to new, non-common law, nonnatural “rights” (For example, statutory rights creating affirmative benefits
or broad freedom from others’ actions extending beyond traditional baseline
conceptions of private rights.)142; and general, diffuse, non-cataclysmic
social and political costs of accommodating religious conduct at variance
from society’s usual rules, including both the costs of accommodation and
the administrative inconvenience inherent in carrying out a requirement of
religious accommodation, are not “harms” sufficient to displace genuine free
exercise claims. All of these are less than truly compelling interests, though
the lines concededly are often difficult to draw.143 Purported injuries or
harm to children, of many (but not all) kinds, tend to be regarded as
compelling, because of problems of consent. But parents’ usual right to
choose how best to care for, educate, and promote the well-being of their
children—including the right to choose the religious upbringing of their
children—usually should lead to children being treated as members of the
religious community of their parents.144

142. This choice of baselines makes sense. The sphere of constitutional religious liberty should
not contract just because the asserted powers of the secular state (including the power to create new
legal rights or interests) expand.
143. For an excellent, classic discussion of the full range of problems and competing interests
occasioned by claims of religious freedom, see Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious
Exemptions—A Research Agenda With Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595 (1999).
144. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See generally Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and
Schools, supra note 23, at 1939–47. This creates extraordinarily difficult problems with regard to
issues of medical care of children, where a religious community’s rules differ dramatically from
society’s, both the religious and human stakes are high, and the life of a child may hang in the
balance. Examples include certain Jehovah’s Witness beliefs against blood transfusions and
Christian Scientist beliefs favoring spiritual to medical treatment of physical illness in many
circumstances. See, e.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), certiorari
denied 516 U.S. 1092 (1996) (upholding damages award for wrongful death of child, against
Christian Science parents and practitioners); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988)
(upholding criminal conviction for manslaughter and felony child neglect of Christian Science
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These limitations—the lines drawn by perceived compelling interests—
are as much intuitive as anything. Yet the intuitions are often valid. In
modern times, these intuitions appear to reflect, and track reasonably
closely, the generally libertarian stance of philosopher John Stuart Mill’s On
Liberty.145 But because people’s intuitions in this regard differ, and are often
a function of their own personal religious beliefs or empathy for religious
conviction generally, they can feel highly subjective. And as a society
changes from a liberal religious society to a modern (or post-modern)
irreligious society, intuitions shift too as to what are sufficiently compelling
interests to trump religious exercise. Society’s interests are ratcheted up in
public estimation, and religious free exercise is less readily indulged as a
prior and superior value. Assertions of important state interests in new
policies or programs readily supplant space formerly reserved for free
religious exercise. The result is that the scope of free exercise becomes
unanchored, tied more to current notions of correct social policy than to any
fixed, determinate original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. And, there
is still the problem that the First Amendment text says nothing at all about
compelling interest exceptions, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, or
anything else of this nature.
I would like to suggest three possible ways to understand “compelling
interest” exceptions to, or overrides of, free exercise claims, that harmonize
better with the text of the First Amendment and with the religious premises
of the Religion Clauses. Each is consistent with the others; indeed, they tend
mutually to reinforce one another. Significantly, each of these arguments
tends to limit, quite strictly, the types of things that can be claimed as
compelling interests. At the same time, these ways of re-formulating
compelling interest redirect the inquiry away from the state and its claimed
interests and toward what plausibly can be claimed in the name of free
exercise of religion.

parents for failing to seek medical treatment for ten-year-old daughter with acute meningitis). See
also Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), certiorari denied 377 U.S.
978 (1964) (ordering involuntary blood transfusion over religious objection of adult member of
Jehovah’s Witness faith); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986) (rejecting wrongful death action against Christian Science practitioners with respect
to adult member). See generally Geraldine Koeneke Russell, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Refusal of
Blood Transfusions: A Balance of Interests, 33 CATH. LAW. 361 (1990); John Alan Cohan, Judicial
Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 860–81
(2006) (reviewing cases where parents and minors have refused life saving treatment based on
religious beliefs).
145. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Simon & Brown 2012) (1869).
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First, one could understand compelling-interest overrides as exceptions
implied out of the very strictest necessity. They are not stated in the text—a
problem, to be sure—but they are arguably implicit in it as a background,
structural principle embedded in the Constitution generally and against
which the natural right of freedom for religious exercise should be read,
understood, and limited.146 This is an imperfect textual argument, but not a
ridiculous one. Significantly, it supports a limitation on “compelling
interest” exceptions to the text’s stated rule only for interests that are
genuinely compelling—and not just for anything and everything government
officials wish to do. The fact that the text does not explicitly set forth such
exceptions should operate as a check against their too-frequent or too-easy
invocation. The presumption runs, strongly, against any such implied
exception. A compelling interest, to be read into the text as an implied
exception, has to be, truly, compelling, “paramount,” of “the highest
order.”147 This, I submit, accords with the nature of the Free Exercise Clause
as an affirmative natural right, protecting the (general) supremacy of free
religious exercise over state power.
A second way of re-thinking “compelling state interest” is that it is
perhaps wrong in the first place to view the issue in terms of the state’s
interests as trumping a claim otherwise authorized by the text of the Free
Exercise Clause. The very formulation subtly implies ultimate state
supremacy, rather than the priority of God. Rather, the phrase may be better
thought an imprecise, inartful way of saying that the conduct at question is
simply outside the domain of what “the free exercise of religion” embraces,
as a matter of the original public meaning of the term itself. The term “free
exercise thereof” may itself entail a limitation in its scope to conduct that
does not seriously injure others outside the religious community and that
does not result in imposition of massive costs on society at large or on
specific individuals. Just as, for example, “the freedom of speech” includes
both more and less than everything that fits the category of “speech,”148 so

146. I have suggested elsewhere that the Constitution’s structure and logic supports a principle of
“necessity” as a rule of construction, and perhaps a freestanding substantive rule, counseling against
readings of rights and powers that threaten to destroy the essential enterprise of constitutional
government, or work truly massive harm on individuals or society, and that this, more than explicit
textual command, is the best explanation of many “compelling interest” tests in current
constitutional doctrine. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1257, 1281–82 (2004); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 721–26 (2004) (noting significance of President Lincoln’s
use of such an interpretive premise to justify his construction of presidential war and emergency
powers under certain circumstances).
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. Some “speech” is categorically excluded from “the freedom of” speech as a matter of the
original meaning of the phrase taken as a whole, in historical context. And, on the other side, certain
expressive conduct, most expressive association, and the freedom not to engage in compelled
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too with religious freedom “the free exercise thereof” simply might not
include, as a matter of original meaning, conduct imposing such grave harms
on others, outside the relevant religious community. The right to “the free
exercise thereof” may well be thought of as entailing some kind of a
jurisdictional principle that, while preventing the state from importing its
rules into the sphere of religious autonomy also prevents the religious
adherent from exporting his rule into the sphere of society outside of the
religious community, by imposing severe externalities.149
The third way to re-understand “compelling interest” may be the most
radical: one could understand limitations on religious liberty claims as
resulting from precisely the religious justification for religious liberty. If the
purpose of and underlying justification for religious liberty is to promote
true religious exercise—true obedience to true commands of God—then
such a liberty in principle (and practically by definition) excludes conduct
one can confidently say proceeds from views outside the realm of
conceivably correct views about what God requires or commands.
On this explanation, a religiously based claim to immunity from the
usual rules of society fails if the conduct claimed to flow from religious duty
violates the clear, universal moral command of God. In other words, the
religious adherent’s claim that God’s command to him is prior to, and
superior to, society’s command, is one that we are prepared to say, however
reluctantly, is simply objectively wrong. The freedom claimed is simply not
one that fairly and plausibly can be attributed to a true command of God.
For example, we can confidently say, as a matter of universal religious and
moral truth, that God (by whatever name called) did not command al Qaeda
members to commit mass murder. Such a religious claim is simply false,
whether or not (and I think it not) it is a plausibly correct explication of
Islam itself and whether or not it is sincerely believed. The extreme,
murderous claims of radical Islamism are simply false claims about God,
and are constitutionally unprotected for that reason.
In the end, this is the most persuasive—but also surely the most
dangerous, if misapplied—argument for overriding claims to religious

expression, are all part of “the freedom of” speech, though they extend beyond literal speech. See
Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, supra note 23, at 1921; see also PAULSEN ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23, at 950–58 (setting forth a “map” of “the
freedom of speech” under the Free Speech Clause).
149. This idea that the Free Exercise Clause sets forth something of a “jurisdictional” principle
was first suggested by a former professor of mine, Professor Perry Dane, in a brilliant student note.
Perry Dane, Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
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liberty on the ground that denying such claims is necessary to prevent
exceptional harm. My suggestion here is surprising and unfamiliar, in part
because our modern era recoils at the idea of describing any claimed
religious belief as “wrong.” But I submit that this is not because we think
such beliefs as al Qaeda’s might be right; rather, it is because our era doubts
that any claimed religious belief is “right.” We rapidly default to a type of
relativism that forbids making any kind of distinctions among claims made
in the name of religion. It is presumptuous and unacceptable, to modern
understandings, to treat any religious belief or exercise as categorically or
even presumptively more right or wrong than any other. It is thus hard for
those holding the modern conception to fathom an approach that would
justify overriding free exercise claims premised on the view that some free
exercise claims are simply untenable as claims about God’s true
commands.150
But is mine really so presumptuous a view? Are there not some things
that are objectively wrong? And do not our intuitions in this regard
ultimately flow from received cultural understandings of what God truly
does or does not command? To be sure, we should be careful about making
such claims—claims of the objective falsity of an asserted religious belief.
The proposition, pressed too far, contains the seeds of destruction of the
principle of religious liberty. Past a certain point, quickly reached, the
business of judging the truth or validity of religious beliefs destroys
religious liberty. We rightly ask: on what principle, consistent with the
premises of religious liberty, can government engage in such enterprise at
all?151
But up to a point, the inquiry is practically unavoidable. All views of
the Free Exercise Clause require some initial inquiry into the sincerity of the
believer’s purported claim and whether the state action in question imposes a
cognizable burden on something that qualifies as religious practice. All
views, at least to that extent, judge the validity of a claimed right to exercise
religion.
Think for a moment about what ultimately lies beneath the intuition that
certain claims of religious freedom simply cannot be honored. At bottom, I

150. The attitude is of a piece with that which produced the extension of the meaning of
“religion” to include non-religious ethical beliefs or principles, discussed above.
151. It has long been held that government may not evaluate the truth or validity of a religious
belief. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944) (stating that “[h]eresy trials are
foreign to our Constitution” and holding that truth or falsity of religious beliefs cannot be submitted
to jury determination); cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)
(“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection.”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969) (finding that courts are not competent to adjudicate “controversies over religious doctrine
and practice”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871) (“The law knows no heresy . . . .”).
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submit, it is one of four thoughts. First, one might think that there is not
really a God who makes claims on humans. That is, the claimants’ claims
are simply not real; the claimant is delusional. (That view of course entails a
denial of the core premise justifying religious liberty.) Second, one might
think that the religious claim is not sincerely believed by the claimant, but a
mere pretext or sham—the claimant is lying. (This inquiry is permitted
under essentially all approaches, at least as a threshold inquiry.) Third, one
might think that the particular religious belief asserted, even if sincerely
held, is simply not true—that, even accepting that God exists and imposes
duties on humans, the believer simply has it wrong. God exists, yes, but
God did not command that. For example, God did not command al Qaeda to
kill innocents. The claim is simply incompatible with what we know and
believe about what God might actually command. (This is the position I am
advancing.)
Finally, there is a fourth possible intuition: that even if one accepts God,
agrees that God makes demands on human behavior, and agrees that in
theory God might make commands that (from a human standpoint) seem
unreasonable, unbelievable, and even immoral, we should still reject certain
religious freedom claims on the ground that what God (purportedly) has
commanded is simply a terrible, awful thing. That is, granting arguendo the
possibility that God might truly command something horrible, man should,
in this respect at least, reject God’s supposed will. This is a seemingly
paradoxical position, but not a nonsensical one. It simply adopts an
overwhelming presumption in favor of the morality, consistency, and
integrity of God with respect to perceived universal moral commands.
While it acknowledges on theological grounds the (theoretical) possibility of
God-prescribed exceptions to, new revelations of, or departures from what
were believed to have been God’s universal moral commands, it refuses to
accept such claims as valid claims to the free exercise of religion where,
from a human perspective, they would work great human harms of the types
discussed above.152

152. It may sound strangely incongruent with traditional western understandings of God to say
that human beings should reject what they believe are the true but morally horrible commands of
God—and that the constitutional protection of free exercise of religion likewise ought not extend to
obedience to such commands. Yet this is sometimes the operative intuition, both at the level of the
individual believer and at the level of a society that respects and seeks to honor religious belief to the
maximum degree. For example, even devout religious believers sometimes may doubt—and
probably should doubt—the propriety of following the perceived commands of God in certain
circumstances. First, they may doubt, (probably rightly) the correctness of their perceptions that
God has in fact commanded or required some morally dubious course of conduct. Second, they
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A slight variation might be the position that, while God might in theory
command humans to do something terrible and contrary to the believed
character of God, a truly extraordinary burden of proof rests on someone
making such a claim. Society should not accept its validity unless that
practically insurmountable burden is satisfied. (Show us the burning bush
that spoke to you a command to murder, rape, pillage, steal, or wage
genocidal war and then we will consider your free exercise claim.)153
In the end, it is a sound intuition that there are some situations in which
a claimed right to religious exercise must fail. But it is important to be clear
on why that should be so, in order to know when such an override to the
presumed right of religious free exercise is proper. It would not be
consistent with the premises of the Free Exercise Clause, and religious
liberty, simply to say that there is no God who makes claims on individuals’
conduct. The whole point of religious freedom is to protect the right and
ability of persons to act in conformity with true commands of God. But it is
consistent with the premises of the Free Exercise Clause to say that it
excludes fraudulent, feigned claims of religious liberty. In such cases, there
is no true command of God to be obeyed. Likewise, it is consistent with the
premises of the Free Exercise Clause to say that a claim, made in the name
of religion, is invalid if it contradicts the apparently clear, universal moral
command of God. In such a case, as in the case of an insincere or pretext
claim, there is no true command of God to be obeyed. There are some things
that we can and should confidently say God thinks are always and
everywhere wrong (or at least we should so presume). Claims to engage in
such conduct are simply beyond the ambit of the text’s protection of the free
exercise of religion.

might doubt the moral propriety of obeying even what they are fully convinced is the command of
God. (The latter situation might well lead the religious adherent to question the correctness of his
perception that God has in fact commanded the conduct in serious moral conflict with the believer’s
prior understandings or intuitions about God’s nature and character.) A believer thus might well
make the moral choice (whether rightly or wrongly) to act in deliberate disobedience to the
perceived command of God. (Religious believers obviously act in disobedience to the believed true
commands of God all the time, for reasons including moral weakness and lack of faith—in a word,
“sin”—but that is a different matter.) From a theological perspective, it also may be appropriate for
one to argue with God when God is thought to have commanded something unreasonable or morally
intolerable. Consider the account in Genesis 18:22, where Abraham is reported negotiating with
God to save Sodom, if Abraham can find fifty innocent people in the City. God agrees, and
Abraham proceeds to bargain God down to forty-five, forty, thirty, twenty, and finally ten. The deal
is struck at ten, but Sodom still loses. See Genesis 18:22–33 (Today’s English Version).).
A society’s stance on religious freedom might validly take a similar view: that even assuming
that some act in theory might have been commanded by God, obedience to a morally horrible
“divine command” nonetheless should not be treated as constitutionally protected conduct—not
because society’s rules should trump God’s but because of legitimate doubt that such a horrible
command really could be a true directive of God.
153. I owe this alternative formulation to a thoughtful conversation with my colleague, Professor
Teresa Collett.
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But we should reach this conclusion not because of any claim that the
state is supreme—that its compelling interests prevail over God’s
commands. Rather, it is because we accept the idea of the priority of God’s
true commands that we should reject claims that we know to be contrary to
God’s clear, universal moral commands.
What sorts of things are included in that description? There will still be
arguments over what falls in this category and what does not. There will
still be close cases, difficult cases, and uncertain lines. That problem exists
under any approach that takes Free Exercise seriously. If the text of the
Constitution requires those applying it faithfully to engage in that sometimes
difficult process, that is what must be done. The approach I have suggested
does not pretend to eliminate this problem, but would simply resolve more
contested issues in favor of religious claimants—relocating the line-drawing
inquiry to a different range on the continuum of possible claims. The
arguments will be somewhat different arguments, and somewhat different
cases will be the difficult cases, for somewhat different reasons, than under
pre-Smith “compelling interest” jurisprudence. In the main, the type of
conduct that will fail of constitutional protection is of the type specifically
and consistently prohibited by the moral codes of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, in things like the Ten Commandments and comparable New
Testament moral codes, and their counterparts in Islam and most other
theistic and even polytheistic religions.154 To a surprising degree, these
common moral prohibitions track the “compelling interest” libertarian
exclusions noted above (although with certain differences with respect to
prohibitions on sexual conduct, which depart from at least modern-day
libertarian sensibilities). Thus, the debates over what conduct cannot
plausibly be attributed to God’s commands might end up looking
considerably like debates over what conduct falls outside the bounds of
libertarian toleration: conduct inflicting serious injury upon non-consenting
third-parties (murder, rape, robbery, fraud, slavery, abortion, aggressive war,
genocide, or other grave harm to others who are not part of the religious
community.) In such cases, the state’s interests prevail over the religious
claimant’s not because the state says so, and not because John Stuart Mill
might have thought so, but because God thinks so.155

154. See, e.g., Exodus 20:13–17 (Today’s English Version); Romans 1:18–32 (Today’s English
Version); 1 Corinthians 5:11, 6:9–10 (Today’s English Version).
155. I do not wish to engage in a systematic consideration of every conceivable claim to religious
freedom in conflict with secular law, or even to address how every Free Exercise Clause decision of
the Supreme Court should have been decided. But I depart from that policy, to an extent, simply to
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***
The Free Exercise Clause is thus best understood as a sweeping
protection of freedom to engage in religious conduct, even when at odds
with the usual commands of civil government. Understood as protecting the
priority of God’s commands over man’s, the Free Exercise Clause means
that religious conduct is presumptively immune from the usual authority of
the state. It means that religious conduct and only religious conduct—
conduct rooted in the believer’s understanding of the commands or
expectations of God, and not a mere personal moral or ethical philosophy or
analogous secular belief system—is, to the extent of the Free Exercise
Clause’s constitutional immunity from government’s power, affirmatively
preferred to non-religious conduct. And it means that the limitations on
religious freedom are, likewise, better understood as flowing from
essentially religious limits on what plausibly can be credited as a true
command or requirement of God, not merely from ad hoc evaluation of the
importance of asserted secular interests of civil government.

note that, under the view I have sketched here, several of the Supreme Court’s decisions are certainly
wrong and many more are at least questionable. E.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (no
showing of pretext or universally wrongful conduct posing grave injury to private rights of nonconsenting third parties); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (wrong in part; questionable in part); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Heffron v. Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (wrong on disregarded free exercise
claim even if right on addressed free speech ground); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(wrong as to religious claimant); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (outrageously wrong
holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not forbid government from compelling public
affirmation contrary to religious conviction); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(dubious pre-incorporation case: questionable whether non-vaccination on religious grounds injures
non-consenting third parties by wrongful conduct external to the religious community); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (no showing of pretext or universally wrongful conduct posing
grave injury to private rights of non-consenting third parties). In each of these cases, the religious
adherent’s claims were neither insincere nor discredited as obviously contrary to clear, universal
moral commands of God, nor such as demonstrably to work serious injury to the baseline or natural
rights of non-consenting third parties, outside the relevant religious community. In addition, Locke
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), is wrong even on the narrow view of free exercise as invalidating
only laws that single out religious conduct for discriminatory treatment.
I have discussed some of these cases at length in other writing addressing the Free Exercise
Clause issues presented therein. See Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 265–68
(discussing United States v. Lee, Bowen v. Roy, Hernandez v. Commissioner, Goldman v.
Weinberger, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association); Paulsen, Equal Protection Approach, supra note 5, at 362–68 (discussing Bob Jones
University v. United States,461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
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B. The Establishment Clause as a Protection of Freedom—For Religion
What about the Establishment Clause? How does it fit within this
understanding of religious freedom? Does it fit at all? Does it not lean
rather against the idea of special protection of religious conduct, and thus
the strong pro-exemptions reading of the Free Exercise Clause, by
forbidding government from “favoring” religion?
These questions have altogether straightforward answers, but those
answers have eluded modern courts and commentators. Blinded by the
modern paradigm, and seemingly indifferent to how anachronistic it is as a
mode of understanding the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
(proposed and adopted in the late eighteenth century), modern would-be
interpreters of the Establishment Clause have sought to transform it from a
cognate protection of religious liberty into a limitation on religion. On this
reading, the Establishment Clause checks religion’s ability to play a role in
public life and balances government’s (including courts’) constitutional duty
to accommodate free exercise with a requirement of secular neutrality
toward religion. The Establishment Clause comes first, textually, and on
this view of it constrains both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech
Clause, which follow. Religion should be excluded from the public square;
religious arguments and advocacy should be excluded from public discourse;
religious motivations should invalidate laws reflecting such motivation or
inspiration; religious speakers and groups should not be accorded equal
access to public forums for expression or public benefits to which they
would otherwise be entitled; and religious free exercise should never be
specially accommodated, in the form of specifically religious exemption
from laws of otherwise general applicability.156
Under the original conception of religious liberty embodied in the
religion clauses, each of these conclusions is wrong—indeed, 180 degrees
wrong; they state exactly the opposite of the original meaning of the First
Amendment. If religious liberty exists for the benefit of religion—as a
freedom for religion, protecting it from government—it becomes utterly
implausible to read the Establishment Clause as some sort of anti-religion
counterweight to the Free Exercise Clause—a freedom from religion. It is
also implausible as a simple textual matter to read the First Amendment as

156. For accounts (and criticism) of such views, as applied in various issue-specific contexts and
discussing specific cases, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Things Happened on the Way to the
Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on ‘Equal Access’ for Religious Speakers and
Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 653–68 (1996); Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 5, at 800–
19.
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deliberately embracing self-contradictory principles.157
Rather, the
Establishment Clause can be seen in its natural, and original, sense as a
protection of religious liberty motivated by the second of the paradigms
discussed in Part II, above: it embodies the view that religious truth exists
but that the secular state has no proper role in prescribing religious
orthodoxy or compelling religious observance. The Establishment Clause is
not a freedom-from-religion provision. It is a freedom-of-religion-fromgovernment provision. It specifically dis-empowers the state in matters of
religious exercise. As such, it is of a piece with the conception of religious
liberty as reflecting the view that God’s commands have priority over the
state’s; it embraces a corollary proposition, that the state is not competent to
decide for individuals what is true religion and what God’s commands are.
This too reflects religious premises, widely subscribed to in religious,
post-Great Awakening (yet still Enlightenment-influenced) America—the
America that existed at the time of the framing of the Religion Clauses—that
genuine religious faith does not come from coercion, but from free inquiry
and free persuasion; that religious truth prospers best in an atmosphere of
liberty; and that religious truth does not require government coercion to
prosper, but instead can be impeded by such coercion. Such notions are not
in any sense a retreat from belief in the priority of God and God’s
commands. On the contrary, they are an application of that belief: the
priority of God, taken seriously, means the consistent disavowal of state
authority in matters of religion.
The Establishment Clause, then, is a provision that prohibits government
from compelling or requiring persons to engage in religious exercise against
their will. It “imposes a disability on the exercise of government power in
such a manner as to compel religious belief or exercise or to punish failure
to adhere to a state-prescribed religious orthodoxy.”158 As I have explained
(at much greater length) elsewhere, the Establishment Clause protects the
free non-exercise of religion in the same breath that the Free Exercise Clause

157. See Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1613–14 n.9 (collecting
arguments and authorities); see also Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 5, at 801–02. The Supreme
Court persists in embracing a limited version of this odd Religion-Clauses-as-self-contradiction
position in dicta noting a supposed “tension” between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause and the need to find some room for “play in the joints” between competing
principles. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012);
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005); Locke, 540 U.S. at 718–19.
158. Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1610. I have advanced the
following as a statement of the rule of law supplied by the Establishment Clause:
Government may not, through direct legal sanction (or threat thereof) or as a condition of
some other right, benefit, or privilege, require individuals to engage in acts of religious
exercise, worship, expression or affirmation, nor may it require individuals to attend or
give their direct and personal financial support to a church or religious body or ministry.
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 5, at 43.
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protects the free exercise of religion.159 The clauses work in parallel, and
operate in a similar fashion, protecting a single value of freedom for
religion, but from two directions. The Establishment Clause forbids
government prescription of religious exercise; the Free Exercise Clause
forbids government proscription of religious exercise. They are not at all
contradictory or even in tension. Rather, they are two sides of the same
coin.160
It follows that the Establishment Clause certainly does not require the
exclusion of religious speakers, groups, and persons, from public forums and
public benefits. It follows that the Establishment Clause is not so much
concerned with government “endorsement” of religion as with actual
coercion of religious exercise.161 Endorsement without coercion is simply
government speech, which may be troubling and irritating at times, but in
principle poses no different problem for government speech about religion
than for government speech on any other topic. And it follows, most
significantly, that the Establishment Clause neither disfavors
accommodation of genuine religious exercise, leans against the exemptions
reading of the Free Exercise Clause as an affirmative substantive right, nor
requires that religious and non-religious conscientious claims be treated
alike. A reading of the Establishment Clause that emasculates the Free
Exercise Clause—and the core idea that religious liberty exists specifically
to protect religion—is simply not faithful to the original, core conception of
religious liberty under the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The view I have sketched here is in some ways radical. It represents a
major departure, in its basic conception, from most accounts of
constitutional religious freedom in America today. Further, it contemplates
a fairly radical revision of current First Amendment doctrine. In another
sense, however, the view I have sketched here is merely restorative. Its
radicalism (if it really can be called that) lies in its return to original
principles—a return to a lost, or at least neglected, account of the real reason

159. Paulsen, Equal Protection Approach, supra note 5, at 313–14; see also Paulsen, Lemon is
Dead, supra note 5, at 800–08.
160. See supra note 158.
161. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 933 (1986). For a lighthearted take on the issue of government “endorsement” of religion
through speech or symbols, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is St. Paul Unconstitutional?, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (2006).
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for religious liberty, as understood at the time of the formation of the
Constitution. To the extent we have wandered far from those original
principles and reasons; to the extent that our world today looks and feels
very different from the more religiously serious world in which the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment were incubated and hatched; to the extent
that our now long-familiar modern doctrinal constructs and paradigms
ignore or slight those original reasons for, and original meanings of, freedom
for religion; and to the extent returning to those original views would
produce sometimes surprising conclusions and results, the constitutional
view I have sketched here will appear radical. The challenge I offer is to
return to this lost world, on the ground that it is the correct way of
understanding religious liberty under the original meaning of the
Constitution’s Religion Clauses, and that such meaning must be regarded as
controlling for us today for as long as we are governed by a written
Constitution that contains those provisions.
In his insightful commentary on this paper in draft form, when I
presented it at the “Conflicting Claims” conference sponsored by Pepperdine
University School of Law in February 2012, Professor Eugene Volokh cut
me to the quick—or so I felt, at first—with the seemingly devastating
objection (or insult) that my proposed reinterpretation of the Religion
Clauses, under which good faith claims of religious liberty very often but not
always defeat application of society’s laws to particular religious conduct,
transformed the Free Exercise Clause into a “Super-Lochner” doctrine. My
reading, Volokh charged, like the discredited Lochner doctrine of
“substantive due process,” would license courts to strike down the
application of society’s laws whenever they impair specified claims of
“liberty.” 162
Professor Volokh’s objection has some persuasive force—and
considerable rhetorical power. It is essentially the objection that Justice
Scalia made to a strong reading of the Free Exercise Clause at the conclusion

162. The doctrine of “substantive due process,” while intellectually discredited, keeps coming
back—like a bad penny. Its first cataclysmic appearance to invalidate a major legislative act was in
the Supreme Court’s monstrous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), though the
doctrine is most closely associated with the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The
Supreme Court decisively repudiated the Lochner approach, which reigned for nearly forty years in
the early-twentieth century, in a series of cases in the mid-twentieth century, only to return to the
doctrine in a different form in the last third of the twentieth century. See PAULSEN ET AL., supra
note 23, at 1515–47. For an excellent grand tour of the rise, fall, rise, fall, and rise of this generally
discredited doctrine, see Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (2004).
Professor Volokh’s “Super-Lochner” quip had special bite for me because I have been a
consistent and sometimes vehement critic of the doctrine. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1007–25 (2003); see also
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 895–
97.
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of his majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,163 and that may
well have been the driving psychological intuition underlying the entire
Smith opinion.
But I wonder. As I replied at the conference: What if there really were a
“Substantive Due Process Clause” in the Constitution? What if the
Constitution actually said something like this: “Government may make no
law prohibiting economic freedom.” As undesirable as Professor Volokh
(and I) might think such a constitutional provision, if it were really there in
the Constitution, it presumably would be the duty of judges and political
officials (and law professors) to apply and follow it faithfully, irrespective of
their views as to its desirability. The task of faithful constitutional
interpretation would be to seek to discern and correctly apply the original
public linguistic meaning of such an Economic Substantive Due Process
Clause. And if the proper performance of that task produced something
resembling a Lochner doctrine—even a “Super-Lochner” doctrine—so be it.
And so I chose, and still choose, to embrace Professor Volokh’s insultinsight rather than deny it: The Free Exercise Clause is, within the sphere of
its objects, a Super-Lochner doctrine. If the account I have given here is
correct, the Free Exercise Clause in fact says something akin to my
hypothetical Economic Substantive Due Process clause. It does not say that
government may “make no law prohibiting economic freedom,” but it does
say that government shall “make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of
religion. Interpreting and applying such a provision may be very much like
interpreting my imagined Economic Substantive Due Process Clause.
Accordingly, taken seriously on its own terms, the Free Exercise Clause may
well entail a “Super-Lochner” doctrine of a sort. It is a Super-Lochner
Clause limited to specific kinds of claims of individual liberty. The objects
the right embraces, and the limitations on its scope, are ones specific to that
text. It does not operate to invalidate a law in its entirety, but merely to
prevent its application to specific individual or group religious conduct. But
it does trump, more than occasionally, the usual powers of government. It is
like Lochner in that respect, to be sure.
But it is unlike Lochner in that, unlike the hypothetical Economic
Substantive Due Process Clause, there really is a Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. That clause, understood in historical-social and linguistic
context, takes as its starting point the premise that individual claims to freely

163. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990) (“It is . . . horrible to contemplate
that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of
religious practice.”).
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exercise the requirements or duties of their religious faith really should and
do, in principle, have priority over the competing commands of the state.
The Free Exercise Clause is thus best read to bar application of laws that
operate so as to prohibit the free exercise of religion. It generally
excludes—exempts—good-faith (pun intended) religious conduct from the
ambit of secular government’s authority, subject to defeasance only in the
most clear and extreme circumstances in which the claimed right can be said
not to have a good-faith basis in anything that can be plausibly attributed to
the commands of God. The First Amendment Religion Clauses, in short, are
a constitutional trump on what would otherwise be regarded as the proper
authority of the state, flowing from a natural law understanding of the
priority of God’s true claims on human conduct over any competing
obligation imposed by Man.
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